In 1986 when the space shuttle Challenger launched from Kennedy Space Center people watched in awe for a little more than a minute before the shuttle exploded in flight. This was the first of only two major accidents that occurred during over two decades of NASA’s shuttle program. Many would consider the Challenger disaster to be a fluke that could not have been prevented or predicted but, In truth, it was an accident waiting to happen and was a symptom of systemic problems that were occurring at NASA during that era. The 1986 space shuttle Challenger disaster was cause by a number of factors including structural failure of the shuttle, a change in NASA’s work environment from the days of the successful Apollo missions, and additional pressure on the space program, already lacking resources, to push the envelope farther, faster, and cheaper.
The first and most obvious cause in the challenger disaster was the booster rocket, but it wasn’t just an isolated incident. The problems with the solid rocket booster started before it was ever built by Morton Thiokol Inc. People who remember the challenger explosion will remember weeks of reviews by the media focusing on the booster and the part it played in the Challenger’s mid-air explosion. As detailed in the Report to the President by the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident published by the United States Government after a six month investigation into the cause of the challenger disaster, puffs of smoke were seen coming from the lowest segment of the right solid rocket booster shortly after liftoff (United 19). Smoke became fire igniting the main fuel tank and the lower joint joining the booster to the main fuel tank released the booster partially causing ...
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... bad solid rocket booster seal. The events and circumstances that led contributed to the Challenger disaster mostly have to do with human error. If a company had been chosen to build the booster based on the actual merits of their design instead of cost then it is possible that the booster would never have caused the shuttle to fall apart. If manager had made decisions based on the safety information that was available to them or if a lone engineer had chosen to go outside the organization and speak about the shuttle’s safety issues then the shuttle launch would have been delayed. Moreover Administrators should have asked the pertinent “can NASA actually launch 12 or 24 shuttles per year with the current resources?” then the flight rate would have stayed low until NASA was ready to grow. In the end people caused the Challenger disaster and blamed it on a booster.
Are you focused on what you're doing and thinking during an emergency? Do you just give up if you’re stuck in a problem? In the Scholastic Scope article, “Disaster in Space,” it teaches us that in an emergency, we should remain calm and focused on the problem and to never give up, as the astronauts and engineers involved in the Apollo 13 mission did during an emergency on the spacecraft. These processes are exemplified in the Scholastic Scope article, “Disaster in Space” when it talks about how three astronauts handle an emergency that would have costed their lives. In conclusion, in the Scholastic Scope article, “Disaster in Space,” it teaches us that in an emergency, we should remain calm and focused on the problem, use our ingenuity, and never give up, as the astronauts and engineers involved in the Apollo 13 mission did during an emergency on the spacecraft.
While seated in the Oval Office of the White House, January 28, 1986 President Ronald Reagan delivers his speech The Challenger Disaster hours after the space shuttle The Challenger explodes while in take off. Thousands witnessed this horrifying event live, in person and on television. This mission was very unique, allowing the first civilian to ever be allowed in space during a mission. She was aboard The Challenger as an observer in the NASA Teacher in Space Program. Ironically, nineteen years before this disaster, three astronauts were tragically lost in an accident on the ground.
The Hindenburg was a luxury airship, from nazi Germany. This "Titanic of the skies" (no pun intended) was destroyed by a flash fire in 1937 while landing in New Jersey after making its 10th transatlantic crossing. Thirty-five of the 97 people aboard and one ground crew member were killed when the blimp burst into flames and was rapidly consumed by the fire.
"Solid Rocket Boosters." NASA. Ed. Jim Wilson. NASA, 5 Mar. 2006. Web. 11 Apr. 2014.
NASA has faced many tragedies during their time; but one can question if two of the tragedies were preventable by changing some critical decisions made by the organization. The investigation board looking at the decisions made for the space shuttle tragedies of the Columbia and Challenger noted that the “loss resulted as much from organizational as from technical failures” (Bolman & Deal, 2008, p. 191). The two space shuttle tragedies were about twenty years apart, they both had technical failures but politics also played a factor in to these two tragedies.
January 28, 1986 was a day of excitement and anticipation for the United States Space Program. Thousands gathered around television sets and radios to listen and watch the take off of the space shuttle, “The Challenger.” The challenger took off with seven brave astronauts ready to explore space, but their journey was cut short when the Challenger exploded in mid air seventy-three seconds after take-off. The citizens of the United States were shocked by this tragedy and looked to their president for comfort and logic. President Ronald Reagan delivered his address later that evening to the nation regarding the tragedy. Reagan spoke to thousands of American citizens over television and radio to help ease the pain that
The Challenger disaster of 1986 was a shock felt around the country. During liftoff, the shuttle exploded, creating a fireball in the sky. The seven astronauts on board were killed and the shuttle was obliterated. Immediately after the catastrophe, blame was spread to various people who were in charge of creating the shuttle and the parts of the shuttle itself. The Presidential Commission was decisive in blaming the disaster on a faulty O-ring, used to connect the pieces of the craft. On the other hand, Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, in The Golem at Large, believe that blame cannot be isolated to any person or reason of failure. The authors prove that there are too many factors to decide concretely as to why the Challenger exploded. Collins and Pinch do believe that it was the organizational culture of NASA and Morton Thiokol that allowed the disaster. While NASA and Thiokol were deciding whether to launch, there was not a concrete reason to postpone the mission.
It’s very hard to say what steps, if any, could have been taken to prevent the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster from occurring. When mankind continues to “push the envelope” in the interest of bettering humanity, there will always be risks. In the manned spaceflight business, we have always had to live with trade-offs. All programs do not carry equal risk nor do they offer the same benefits. The acceptable risk for a given program or operation should be worth the potential benefits to be gained. The goal should be a management system that puts safety first, but not safety at any price. As of Sept 7th, 2003, NASA has ordered extensive factory inspections of wing panels between flights that could add as much as three months to the time it takes to prepare a space shuttle orbiter for launch. NASA does all it can to safely bring its astronauts back to earth, but as stated earlier, risks are expected.
R. M. Boisjoly had over a quarter-century’s experience in the aerospace industry in 1985 when he became involved in an improvement effort on the O-ring which connect segments of Morton Thiokol’s Solid Rocket Booster. This was used to bring the Space Shuttle into orbit (OEC, 2006). Morton Thiokol is an aerospace company that manufactures the solid propellant rocket motors used to launch the Challenger (Skubik). Boisjoly authored a memo to R.L. Lund, Vice President of Engineering and four others, in regards to his concerns about the flawed O-ring erosion problem. His warnings were ignored leading to the deaths of six astronauts and one social studies teacher.
On a cold winter’s morning on the 28th day of January in the year 1986, America was profoundly shaken and sent to its knees as the space shuttle Challenger gruesomely exploded just seconds after launching. The seven members of its crew, including one civilian teacher, were all lost. This was a game changer, we had never lost a single astronaut in flight. The United States by this time had unfortunately grown accustomed to successful space missions, and this reality check was all too sudden, too brutal for a complacent and oblivious nation (“Space”). The outbreak of sympathy that poured from its citizens had not been seen since President John F. Kennedy’s assassination. The disturbing scenes were shown repeatedly on news networks which undeniably made it troublesome to keep it from haunting the nation’s cognizance (“Space”). The current president had more than situation to address, he had the problematic undertaking of gracefully picking America back up by its boot straps.
The Space Race began when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik into space in 1957. The United States’ answer to this was the Apollo program. While the Apollo program did have successful launches, such as the Apollo 11 launch that landed Americans on the moon, not every launch went as smoothly. Fifty years ago, a disaster occurred that shook the Apollo program to its core. On January 27, 1967, the Apollo 1 command module was consumed by a fire during one of its launch rehearsal tests. This led to the death of three astronauts, Virgil Ivan “Gus” Grissom, Edward Higgins White, and Roger Bruce Chaffee. The fire was caused by a number of factors, most of which were technical. These causes range from the abundance of oxygen in the atmosphere of the
Even though people knew what had happened, they didn't know why it had happened. Gradually people found the answer. Here's why it happened: the rocket booster's casing was made in different sections. These sections were attached to each other and sealed together with o-rings-rubber rings. The o-rings were held in their places by the pressure of the hot gasses, which were from the rocket booster after it was ignited. On previous missions of the Challenger, the o-rings were found to be worn away by the hot gasses. The o-rings had been tested and the results had shown that the o-rings were a lot more likely to fail in cold or freezing weather. That was what happened on the cold morning of January 28, 1986.
For this assignment we will discuss some theories on organizational change learned during this class and how they relate to the case study of NASA (The Challenger and Columbia Shuttle Disaster). First we will look the images of managing change used by NASA in the case study. Then we will discuss the types of change(s) NASA under took. Next we will look at some of the challenges of change that NASA faced. Next we will discuss some of the resistance to change that NASA dealt with. Then we look at how NASA implemented change. Next we will discuss vision and change and the impact in the case study. Finally we will discuss sustaining change as it relates to the changes implemented by NASA in the case study.
From the discussion during Section 2, NASA 2007 handbook has hugely developed itself comparing to 20 years ago. During 1980s, NASA did not use any system engineering approach which caused the big accident in 1986. On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger exploded in midair, sending six astronauts and schoolteacher Christa McAuliffe to their deaths. After NASA adopted the systems engineering approach and published the systems engineering handbook in 1995, the accident dramatically reduced, only several non-fatal incidents appeared during 1995 to 2002.
NASA’s research and innovation looked promising, but it came at a cost. Money, resources, and spacecraft accidents, most famously Apollo 13 all hindered NASA’s research. In the 21st century, the debate over funding for NASA is at its peak since the birth of the organization in 1958, especially when there are numerous problems throughout the world. Is the money spent on space exploration worth the advantages and advances it contributes to society? When considering this topic, one might ask themselves, why explore space?