Telic Egalitarianism

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Is the goodness of an outcome purely a function of the amount of wellbeing (utility) it contains, or do other factors also matter in themselves? How, exactly, does equality matter?
The assessment of the goodness of an outcome depends not only on the amount of wellbeing contained, but also the presence of equality. I will argue that telic egalitarianism fails to capture the value of equality given the force of the levelling down objection. Furthermore, deontic egalitarianism is rejected because it requires an abandonment of our beliefs in cases like the divided world. Ultimately, I conclude that the objection that prioritarianism gives the wrong conclusion in intrapersonal cases is unconvincing. Therefore, equality matters in the way prescribed …show more content…

Firstly, under the broadest scope of telic egalitarianism, any inequality is bad, which leads to absurd moral guidelines. For instance, it is bad that some people have type 1 diabetes and others do not. By extension, telic egalitarianism morally authorises genetically modifying individuals to become diabetic. This is clearly excessive, thereby indicating that characterising the value of equality as intrinsic is troubling. Telic egalitarianism also encounters the levelling down objection. If inequality is in itself bad, then the disappearance of it must be better. Therefore, inequality may be reduced by decreasing the quality of life for individuals. For example, the Sydney storms earlier in the year resulted in significant damage to beachfront properties. According to telic egalitarians, this outcome is better than the non-arrival of the storm, in terms of equality, because the surplus resources of certain individuals were excised, thus reducing the disparity of wealth. Therefore, whilst equality matters in relation to the goodness of an outcome, it is unhelpful to frame it through the telic …show more content…

It has been contested that deontic egalitarianism is also susceptible to the levelling down objection, despite Parfit’s claim otherwise. Notably, O’Neill argues that a substantive version of the deontic view, states that our “duty to treat people on the basis of equality…involves a duty to promote distributive equality”, fails to avoid it. This substantive version permits distribution such that some individuals are made worse off and none better off, which is precisely the force of the levelling down objection. However, O’Neill does concede that Parfit provides a response to this critique given that deontic egalitarians only “have a reason to remove inequality only when, and only because, [their] way of doing so benefits the people who are worse off”. That is, this narrower deontic view only accepts reasons for levelling up towards equality but not levelling down and thereby avoids the levelling down objection. It is uncharitable of O’Neill to state that no “general case” of deontic egalitarianism can avoid the levelling down objection given that Parfit’s very prescription of the deontic view is identical to the narrower “formal version” of O’Neill’s. Therefore, deontic egalitarianism is in fact not susceptible to the same objection which unhinges the telic

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