Retributivist Theory: The Justification Of Punishment

Another popular approach to justifying punishment comes from retributivist theory, which can be divided into, first, the desert argument, and then the fair play argument. Before a discussion on these theories may begin, it is important to note that unlike the consequentialist argument that looks at the aggregate, these retributivist theories primarily situate the justification of punishment on the individual insofar as that the individual deserves to be punished. This paper contends that although this is a significant consideration, there are still limitations to these approaches.

To start, the just deserts argument begins with a central notion that individuals deserve to suffer punishment as a result of their “voluntary commission of an offence”.

Additionally, the retributivist account would also argue that deserved suffering is a good thing in that criminals need to recognize what they did was wrong in order to appreciate the appropriate relationship between moral conduct and the level of happiness that one can enjoy. Additionally, this definition implies a degree of proportionality since punishment is executed against what is deserved. Thus, the state is justified in punishing guilty offenders proportionately in order to pursue this ideal relationship. However, there are issues concerning the extent to which the state can uphold institutions of punishment given that the retributivist argument is grounded in pursuit of desert and consistency in moral conduct and level of happiness. The retributivist account weakly links the

In breaking the law, this approach views this as an undue advantage over the security of society and, as such, punishment is condoned in order to ensure that all citizens are equally benefiting from the state. Thus, the individual deserves to be punished in order to restore the balance of benefits and burdens. However, here arises a similar aforementioned point of critique. Are there no other ways to redress this balance? Given the vast amount of resources needed to sustain an institution of punishment, would a distribution or supplement of benefits for law-abiders be sufficient for this model? Many would struggle to accept that the violation of laws by one person would necessarily induce benefits for others. So how can one account for a justification of punishment that would exclude the option of additionally rewarding those who do not break the law? From here, this paper moves onto a mixed approach that would contextualize punishment under assumptions regarding the state and society in order to curtail this critique of the retributivist