Post World War II: The Marshall Plan in Western Europe

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To what extent did the Marshall Plan aid Western Europe amidst the devastation of post-WWII?
A. Plan of Investigation
As one of the major theatres of the Second World War, Western Europe was left thoroughly ravaged. Conditions were bleak financially and this area was considered to be the most susceptible to communism. Not only was it geographically closest to a Soviet threat, but it was also the most socially vulnerable. This investigation will attempt to answer the following question: To what extent did the Marshall Plan aid Western Europe amidst the devastation of post-WWII? Two main sources including Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley’s Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938, and The USA and the Cold War, 1945-63 by Oliver Edwards will be assessed on their origin, purpose, value, and limitation. This essay will focus on how through the economic aid of the Marshall Plan, America was able to prevent further westward Soviet expansion in Europe, and restore power to the Great Powers of Western Europe. This essay will not, however, assess the initial congressional and public resistance of the plan and the change in public opinion or the Soviet rejection of the Marshall Plan, and the origins of European division and the Cold War. By stimulating the post-WWII recovery of Western Europe through American economic aid, the US was able to protect the capitalist nature of Western European governments from further Soviet expansion and political seizure.
B. Summary of Evidence
Aid from the Marshall Plan accelerated the economic recovery of Western European nations after the comprehensive desolation of WWII.
 During its four operational years, the Marshall Plan sent $13 billion in aid to 16 Western European countries. By...

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...sed by author Oliver Edwards through the rest of the chapter, a secondary source, regarding the execution of Marshall Plan. Furthermore, the assessment provides an abundance of statistics with regard to the deployment of the program and how Western Europe was aided economically. Despite the apparent value it possesses, this book is limited in regard to the content on the Marshall Plan it provides. Though critically analysed, the content on the Marshall Plan in this book is limited in perspective, as it focuses heavily on Soviet reaction and rejection to the Plan, thereby limiting the amount of information applicable to this essay; it is a clear contradiction to the scope of this assessment. However, this lack of multiple perspectives is compensated with Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 by Ambrose and Brinkley, and other supplementary sources.

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