The iterative process of operational design facilitated the change in the definition of the problem and the reframing of the operational approach that resulted in the surge that would eventually provide a more secure Iraq. This paper will evaluate the planning for the Iraq war and the subsequent reframing by General Petraeus.
Operational Design is a methodology to allow the commander and his staff to visualize broad solutions to attain mission accomplishment. It should be a recursive and ongoing dialogue to understand the nature of the problem and an operational approach to achieve the desired end-state. Two components of the methodology are understanding the operational environment and defining the problem.
The operational environment is an amalgamation of conditions, circumstances and influences that could have a bearing on how the commander employs his forces. It not only includes the various domains that the war could be fought, it encompasses understanding how adversary, friendly, and neutral actors interact. The commander must be able to understand the current environment and the environment at the conclusion of operations to visualize how to solve the problem.
Defining the problem begins with understanding how the actors are inclined to act and how the actors could interact. It also identifies tensions of the current conditions and the end-state. The problem statement explains how the operational variables will resist change and how areas of action can transform existing conditions to the desired end-state.
In November of 2001, Donald Rumsfeld directed a plan that would forcibly remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. CENTCOM had already developed Operations Plan (OPLAN) 1003 to handle another confrontation with...
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...ht point was General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker establishing a Joint Strategic Assessment Team. Its mission was to review the strategic environment, assess the campaign plan, and recommend adjustments to it. General Petraeus lamented that the results of their first report were a bit disheartening, but he pushed the results to Secretary Gates, so the civilian leadership understood the situation on the ground. At that time, everyone needed an unbiased dose of reality.
As the operational environment changed, the operation showed that the United States was not looking at the problem objectively. General Petraeus came in, redefined the problem, and reframed the operational approach. Joint Publication 5.0 captures many of the lessons learned during this time. However, the United States needs to be mindful that it does not fight the last war, as it is prone to do.
Effective planning is impossible without first understanding the problem. Commanders rely on personal observations, experiences, and input from others to develop understanding. They also prioritize information requests and incorporate additional information as those requests are answered. A complete understanding of the problem and environment builds the foundation for the operational process and ...
Strategy depends on numerous analytical factors and some of these present challenges to planners. This essay will identify some of these challenges that strategists encountered during WWII. Moreover, it will present strategy as a fluid process requiring refinement throughout.
As time passes, every society endures situations which stress its' very fabric. Each societies' history is sprinkled with these situations. One such situation which the United States underwent was the Vietnam war. For years this particular event has been hotly debated. Hardly anyone who was present at the time agrees on any point concerning this war, except that they regret it. It has become 'the greatest American foreign policy calamity of the century.' . Now the United States finds itself entangled in another war. A war in Iraq which is beginning to resemble more and more the events of the Vietnam war. Many analysts, and even the public have begun to wonder if the current situation is the same as what took place in Vietnam. The answer is a disturbing yes. The current military engagement in Iraq is showing signs that it will become for this generation what Vietnam was to that generation.
Unified Land Operations defines the army operational design methodology (ADM) as “a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them. The operational design methodology incorporated into army doctrine serves as a method to compliment the military decision making process (MDMP). Although the ADM it is often confused with replacing MDMP, its purpose is to address complex problems from a nonlinear approach. ADM helps the commander to answer questions to problems. However, only a collaborative effort of an operation planning team (OPT) will achieve the approach to answering complex problems. Doctrine alone does not provide the answer to complex problems, but rather offers a guide to solve them. To conceptualize the MDMP, planners must incorporate ADM to provide a better understanding, visualization, and description of the problem. The purpose of this paper is to provide the framework to support why ADM is required in the MDMP.
The text begins by examining a series of wargames developed for the military and the federal government to determine the best options for growing problems around the world (Mark Herman). Additionally, the ground work is placed to outline the goals which are expected by the client. The developers of the simulation begin by finding, with the greatest precision possible, what goals the client plays to achieve (Mark Herman). Moreover, the developers ask a number of questions, to include, is the client needing confirmation of an existing strategy, are they looking for potential weaknesses in their operation, are they looking to develop a new product, and the client needs validation to move forward with the introduction (Mark Herman). If during the test a fundamental weakness or an unforeseen problem arises the methodology is reworked and the test can be run again, all this is done long before any substantial money has been lost. Furthermore, if these tests are conducted by the military, a strategy for either a war time crisis or a civil catastrophe can be formulated long before human live is placed in harm’s way.
War finds success and failure inescapably linked to how well the Combined, Joint, and Multinational Commander ensures the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment” planning is linked to strategic, operational and tactical objectives. General Eisenhower’s Operation OVERLORD, the Allied cross channel, air, and seaborne invasion of France during World War II provides an excellent case study to show successful integration of the principles and the spirit of the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment.” OVERLORD required synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating the logistics capabilities of coalition forces, their equipment as well as civilian manufacturing capabilities to meet the strategic end state (e.g. the defeat of Germany). This article will review the purpose and definition of Joint Sustainment, its imperatives and logistics planning principles and examine how Eisenhower and his planners incorporated these imperatives and principles into Operation OVERLORD.
Operation Desert Shield was launched by President H.W. Bush to increase the amount of forces and troops in areas surrounding Kuwait and mainly in Saudi Arabia in response to the 120,000 troops and 2,000 tanks invading Kuwait. The United Nations called for the Iraqi army’s extraction from their presence in Kuwait, however Hussein went ag...
In this paper, I will provide a Battle Analysis and outline the events leading up to and surrounding the Battle of 73 Eastings (refers to a north-south grid line). In addition, I will describe how the United States Army’s (USA) 2nd Armored Calvary Regiment (ACR) defeated forces from the Iraqi Republican Guard (IRG) using speed, technology and superior combat power. Although some consider the Battle of 73 Eastings extremely successful, some consider it a failure due to the large amount of Iraqi forces that retreated towards Bagdad. Lastly, I will analyze how each side used their intelligence assets and what they could have used to change the outcome.
The 2nd Brigade of 101st Airborne Division found out in the summer of 2004 that they had to prepare for the war in the Middle East more particularly for Iraq. With Colonel Todd Ebel in Command of the 2nd Division with a year to prepare over 3,400 men and woman he got right to work. Colonel Ebel started by choosing his staff and who he thought was fit to take charge and lead this ever more complicated war. It was a huge religious civil war taking place in Iraq at the time with the Sunnis at war against the Shi’ite and after the capture of Saddam insurgency started uprising immediately. This uprising along with the uprising of Muqtada al-Sadr a key leader that had lots of violent followers that soon grew into a form of a militia called Mahdi Army which became another huge problem for the U.S. because the line between a legitamite populist movement and a huge theocratic organized-crime and terror ring was a thin one. The 2nd Brigade Infantry Battalions consisted of 1-502nd (First Strike) and 2-502nd (Strike Force) and 2nd brigade as a whole is known as the “Black Hearts”. Ebel’s mission was to deny insurgent’s access to Baghdad through his AO and as intelligence increased to uproot and destroy insurgent safe havens, while also training the IA so they could ensure the stability of the region later on. Ebel chose Lt. Col. Kunk as commander of “First Strike” 1-502nd and Lt. Col. Haycock as commander of “Strike Force” 2-502nd. By Ebel’s personality evaluations of Kunk and Haycock he decided that Kunk would work in the area that involved him being more engaging where populist centers were and work with local officials and Haycock more in the fighting areas. Kunk was in command of 3 rifle companies, 1 weapons company, 1 logistics company...
Leaders today need to have an appreciation for the operation process, understand a situation, envision a desired future, and to lay out an approach that will achieve that future (Flynn & Schrankel, 2013). Plans need to be created that can be modified to changes in any factors considered. However, plans should not be dependent on specific information being precise or that require things to go exactly according to schedule. Instead, the staff NCO should be flexible where they can and always be prepared for the unexpected. Today’s military members are fighting an unconventional war in Iraq and Afghanistan. The enemy constantly changes their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP’s) to counter the United States technological advances, making planning very difficult for leaders. There are multiple tools at a staff NCO’s disposal to try to anticipate an outcome of a current operation, but also assist with the development of concepts in follow-on missions. The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is just one tool a staff NCO can utilize. In order to stay ahead of the enemy, create effective plans and orders, it is critical for a staff NCO to assist the commander, and understand that the MDMP and planning are essential in defeating the enemy and conserving the fighting force.
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
U.S. launches cruise missiles at Saddam. (2003, March 20). CNN.com. Retrieved February 18, 2010, from http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/19/sprj.irq.main/
John M. Collins is a retired U.S. Army colonel and a distinguished visiting research fellow at the National Defense University. Colonel Collins culminated his military career as the director of military strategy studies and then as chief of the Strategic Research Group at the National War College. He was subsequently the senior specialist in national defense at the Congressional Research Service for twenty-four years.
In today’s operational environments, the U.S. Army is facing a range of problems and mission sets that are arguably more complex than previously encountered. Forces face an array of demands that encompass geo-political, social, cultural, and military factors that interact in unpredictable ways. The inherent complexity of today’s operations has underscored the need for the Army to expand beyond its traditional approach to operational planning. In March 2010 in FM 5-0: The Operations
Define the current situation - break down problem into component parts, identify major problem areas, develop a target improvement goal