Nathan Mueller’s employer, ReliaStar was acquired by the large insurance company ING in 2000. Mueller had a deep understanding of accounting systems and was in charge of transitioning his old employer to the new ERP system. Mueller learned “all aspects of the ERP system including financial reporting, journal entries, and most importantly, checks and wire payment processing” (“Lessons Learned,” 2014). Mueller was an accounting manager of the reinsurance division at one of ING’s offices. He stole almost $8.5 million in a little over four years. Mueller’s department at ING was the reinsurance division, which gave him the ability to approve company checks of up to $250,000. He embezzled this significant amount of money from his employer by requesting …show more content…
He created a dummy company so he could write checks out to that company and use the stolen money for his own purposes. Mueller did not have to create a client name in ING’s accounting system because ING already did a lot of business with a company with “Ace” in its name. Using this system, Mueller embezzled about $8 million in a four-year period. The fraud was concealed by hiding the debits in an expense-type ledger account with lots of reconciliation activity. Furthermore, Mueller was undervaluing the Canadian dollar when recording ING investment income from Canadian investments. Segregation of duties was severely lacking because Mueller was the only one reconciling this account for seven years. According to the article, ING’s accounting system had “thousands of journal entries and billions of dollars of transactions” (“Lesson’s Learned,” …show more content…
For good behavior and completing a drug abuse for alcohol, he is due released only after about five and a half years in prison. A lot of systems were missing or manipulated to commit the fraud. ING top management should be aware that Mueller knows all the inner workings of his division’s ERP system and that the opportunity for fraud is stronger. He also had full authority to request and approve checks, while simultaneously writing associated journal entries to conceal the embezzlement. Segregating the operational duties from the recordkeeping responsibilities is a way that could have prevented this fraud. Authentication controls put in place to restrict access to other employer’s computers would have prevented Mueller from impersonating the subordinate or coworker. A lower limit should have also been placed on Mueller’s approval authority of
Debra became the assistant vice-president and manager of energy lending of a Canadian Western Bank on January 31, 2006. Within a month Debra set up her embezzlement scam by creating two corporations that the embezzled funds would be funnelled too. Debra set up an account in a woman’s name using the woman’s GIC (guaranteed investment certificate) which was worth 8 million dollars. Debra started with 100,000 dollars in a line of credit using the woman’s name and increased it 6 times until the line of credit reached $950,0000 on November 6, 2007. Additionally, Debra arranged for 5 new accounts in the same woman’s name with a total deposit of $16.4 million. Debra made 72 unauthorized withdrawals from the fake account in the two year time frame of the scam. She kept the scam going by transferring money from the
So just how did Scott Welch fit the profile of the average perpetrator? Based off the information reported by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners’ (ACFE) 2010 Report to the Nation, Welch fit directly into the median for a perpetrator – he was male, between the ages of 46 – 50, had a tenure of at least 6 – 10 years, an executive position as a Vice President. According to the ACFE’s report a perpetrator’s position within the company, age, tenure, gender and education level all have a have consideration in a fraud. In the 2010 report, it is noted that 66.7% of all frauds are perpetrated by men, more than likely due to the fact that more men hold a position of authority. Of the cases studied, 74% of all managers and 88% of all owners/executives were men (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), 2010). The combination of Welch’s tenure and authoritative position may have exacerbated the losses suffered by Wachovia and may also have helped him hide the fraud from detection for an extended period of time of eight years (“Former Wachovia,” 2011). This period is well above and beyond the 24 months reported by the ACFE as the median time frame in which frauds perpetrated by executives/owners were detected (ACFE, 2010). Taking into consideration all the kn...
I believe that asset misappropriation by accounts payable fraud is occurring at Wayland Manufacturing Company due to a lack of proper internal controls. Making the company’s Chief Accountant responsible for additional day-to-day functions provides him with opportunity to commit by creating fictitious vendors with his information and then creating fictitious invoices. Newbaker can then conceal his fraud by approving the invoices for payment. Employees working at an organization for more than five years are more likely to commit fraud. Therefore, Newbaker’s six-year history with the company has made him trustworthy and very knowledgeable, which could indicate involvement in asset misappropriation. The high employee turnover could represent a past fraudster leaving before getting caught or employees refusing to continue with the asset misappropriation. In addition, the varying monthly accounts payable transactions ranging from the lowest being April 2014 and
Madura, Jeff. What Every Investor Needs to Know About Accounting Fraud. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004. 1-156
I don’t want them here if they don’t represent the culture of the company,” says John Stumpf, the company’s longtime chief executive, in an interview with The Washington Post. It is obvious that simple employees and managers could not break the law if someone from the top did not allow them to do so. But the executive board of Wells Fargo claimed that they only fired 1 percent of below employees and some managers for fraudulent accounts, but they also might be involved in that business crime, although to build a case against a company executive, prosecutors would have to show “they knew there was a plan to create false accounts to drive up sales,” said Brandon L. Garret, a professor at the University of Virginia School of Law. Even if it appears that the executive purposefully attempted to avoid knowing about the fraud, prosecutors may be able to build a case. Because they don’t have to participate if there is willful negligence.
Today, worldwide, there are several thousands of crimes being committed. Some don’t necessarily require a lethal weapon but are associated with various types of sophisticated fraud, this also known as a white-collar crime. These crimes involve a few different methods that take place within a business setting. While ethical business practices add money to the bottom line, unethical practices are ultimately leading to business failure and impacting the U.S. financially.
Although many of her actions were parallel with fellow manager in General Accounting Troy Nordmand’s, he did not receive a prison sentence due to the fact that he attempted to leave the company (although Vinson did initially plan to resign). Conversely, Vinson was sentenced to five months in prison and five months of home detention. One particularly interesting aspect of Betty Vinson’s case is the inclusion of her concerns over taking home pay and having health insurance, in addition to the fact that she had a positive reputation and was known for doing “anything you told her”. While it is normal to have concerns over job security, the emotional appeals in her situation add a different side to the story. One could argue that she is a victim -- she could have been targeted due to her reputation, or that fear drove her to do things she otherwise would not have considered. The issue here, however, is that she facilitated the fulfillment of Sullivan’s requests and pleaded guilty to one count of securities fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud. As far as the case specifies, despite any superior’s knowledge of Vinson’s tendencies, she was not absolutely forced to do or not do anything. Because she committed the crime and pleaded accordingly, the criminal charges and consequent sentencing was both expected and
Perri, J.D., CFE, CPA, F. (2011, January/February). White-collar crime punishment too much or not enough?. FRAUDMAGAZINE, Retrieved from http://www.all-about-forensic-science.com/support-files/white-collar-crime-punishment.pdf
Weld, L. G., Bergevin, P. M., & Magrath, L. (2004). Anatomy of a financial fraud. The CPA
Ivan Boesky pleaded guilty to the biggest insider-trading scheme discovered by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). He made 200 million dollars by profiting from stock-price volatility on corporate mergers. What he actually did was cheat by using illegally obtained secret information about impending mergers to buy and sell stock before mergers became public knowledge/ Although insider trading is nothing new, the SEC knows it has become a threat to the public’s confidence, and they must enforce regulations to stop criminal activity. The SEC has put pressure on managers to regulate information leaks, promising strict legal enforcement if a business fails to police misuse of privileged employee information.
Unethical accounting practices involving Enron date back to 1987. Enron’s use of creative accounting involved moving profits from one period to another to manipulate earnings. Anderson, Enron’s auditor, investigated and reported these unusual transactions to Enron’s audit committee, but failed to discuss the illegality of the acts (Girioux, 2008). Enron decided the act was immaterial and Anderson went along with their decision. At this point, the auditor’s should have reevaluated their risk assessment of Enron’s internal controls in light of how this matter was handled and the risks Enron was willing to take The history of unethical accounting practic...
White-collar crimes and organizational structure are related because white collar-crimes thrive in organizations that have weak structures. According to Price and Norris (2009), the elites who commit white collar-crimes usually exploit weaknesses in organizational structure and formulate rules and regulations that favor their crimes. Makansi (2010) examines case studies to prove that white-collar crime is dependent on organizational structure. For example, the financial crisis that Merchant Energy Business faced in 2001-2002 occurred due to the liberal Financial Accounting Board, which failed to provide a standard model of valuing natural gas and fuel. Moreover, a financial crisis that rocked the securitization market in 2008 was due to fraudulence in the pricing of securitization products. These examples ...
Prior to 2000, Enron was an American energy, commodities and service international company. Enron claimed that revenue is more than 102 millions (Healy & Palepu 2003, p.6). Fortune named Enron “American most innovative company” for six consecutive years (Ehrenberg 2011, paragraph 3). That is the reason why Enron became an admired company before 2000. Unfortunately, most of the net income for the years 1997-2000 is overstated because of unethical accounting errors (Benston & Hartgraves 2002, p. 105). In the next paragraph, three main accounting issues will identify for what led to the fall of Enron.
Dowd (2016) runs above and beyond with the clarification to state accounting fraud incorporates the change of accounting records in regards to sales, incomes, costs and different components for a profit motive, for example, boosting organization stock prices, getting ideal financing or maintaining a strategic distance from obligation commitments. Dowd is of the feeling that covetousness, absence of straightforwardness, poor administration data and poor accounting interior controls are a couple of explanations behind accounting fraud. (Dowd,
The Tyco accounting scandal is an ideal illustration of how individuals who hold key positions in an organization are able to manipulate accounting practices and financial reports for personal gain. The few key individuals involved in the Tyco Scandal (CEO Kozlowski and CFO Swartz), used a number of clever and unique tactics in order to accomplish what they did; including spring loading, manipulating their ‘key-employee loan’ program, and multiple ‘hush money’ payouts.