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Debates of the nature of the mind have long been central to psychology. The encyclopaedia Britannica defines the mind as the source of “such occurrences as sensations, perceptions, emotions, memory, desires, various types of reasoning, motives, choices, traits of personality, and the unconscious” (Mind, n.d.)
Mind is in the head, as well as culture and society. I will argue that this proposition that some theorists defend is problematic in its use of the term ‘mind’. There needs to be a clear distinction between the psychological processes that happen within our head and the social interactions enabled by our mind that shape our society. For the purpose of this essay, culture and society shall simply be regarded as the social environment in which we live.
The mind, as conceptualised over the last centuries, remains a debated topic in its relation to the body and the environment (Mind, n.d; Pinker, 2002). This essay begins by supporting the monist notion of an embodied mind, shaped by environment and genetics.
In addressing the question of the extent to which mind is in society, this will be discussed from the standpoint of social constructionism. I argue against the individual mind being situated in society on the basis of 2 propositions:
1. Social constructions are the result of collective minds rather than the individual, and this distinction is vital. The mind should be thought of as the tool for the creation of these constructs.
2. There is more to the mind than can be expressed in shared symbols and there is an individual part of the mind that is inaccessible to the social and can thus not be situated in society.
Finally, the connections between the mind and the social are so close that the two entities run danger...
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Mind (n.d.) In Encyclopædia Britannica online. Retrieved from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/383523/mind
Duveen, 2007: 545 – can change culture by changing social rep
Social representation gains its power from being shared and accepted, thereby making something novel familiar (Himmelweit, 1990:30)
The mind-body problem has kept philosophers busy ever since Descartes proposed it in the sixteenth century. The central question posed by the mind-body problem is the relationship between what we call the body and what we call the mind—one private, abstract, and the origin of all thoughts; the other public, concrete, and the executor of the mind’s commands. Paul Churchland, a proponent of the eliminative materialist view, believes that the solution to the mind-body problem lies in eliminating the single concept that allows this problem to perpetuate—the folk psychological concept of mental states. Churchland argues that the best theory of mind is a materialistic one, not a folk psychological one. Unlike other materialist views such as identity theory, Churchland wants to remove the idea of mental states from our ontology because mental states cannot be matched 1:1 with corresponding physical states. This is why Churchland’s view is called eliminative materialism—it is a materialistic account of the mind that eliminates the necessity for us to concern ourselves with mental events. At first this eliminative materialism appears to be a good solution to the mind-body problem because we need not concern ourselves with that problem if we adopt Churchland’s view. However, there is a basic flaw in his argument that raises the question of whether we should actually give up folk psychology. In this paper, we will first walk through the premises of Churchland’s argument, and then we will explore whether Churchland does a suitable job of justifying our adoption of eliminative materialism.
Metaphors, then, are at the heart of understanding the way we view aspects of our culture while we simultaneously build that culture. Umberto Eco stresses that culture is a collective experience. In his view, "there is no such thing as a single mind, un connected to other minds or to their (collective) social cultural constructions" (Cunningham, "MOM" handout). If this is taken as fact, the "social, cultural, historical, and institutional contexts" humans find themselves in contribute to creating their metaphors and in turn, their artifactual worlds. Therefore, the situational context and the metaphors found there are intertwined and must be examined together.
The mind versus the body has been a debate for many years, debate has always proven to be an extremely controversial discussion between various people and their beliefs. For many the idea of the mind being separated from the body is impossible to even think about and unreasonable, yet others may argue that mind can in fact be an entity apart from a physical body. Those who are monist believe that the world is simply made up of one substance, and minds must be contained in a tangible body in order to exist (“Monism”). Contrastingly, dualists emphasize the idea that the mind and the body are each compsed of different substances, allowing the pair to be separate. While these ideas have been unde scrutiny
Evolutionary psychology is a specialist field within the spectrum of psychological enquiry, which seeks to examine and understand some of the predominant reasoning behind the concept of why the human species, whilst biologically similar to other species on the planet, is so very distinct in terms of intelligence and mental progression; demonstrated by the multifaceted and complex social structures we have created. Primary to this domain of evolutionary psychological interest is the notion of ‘theory of mind’, which was developed and advocated by Premack and Woodruff (1978), and has been the topic of fierce discussion and analysis since. It has resulted in manifold research studies and commentaries, regarding the topic, from an extensive range of sources within the academic field of psychology. This essay intends to explore the concept of theory of mind, using examples and research studies to fathom its relevance, application and significance within evolutionary psychology as a whole.
To some degree everyone is influenced by social identity, the theory composes the idea that the social world is divided into ...
Over the years, many philosophers have tried to answer the elusive mind-body problem. There has been a wide range of approaches to comprehend this matter, but perhaps none as renowned as Cartesian dualism. This theory, proposed by René Descartes in the early seventeenth century, is still central to modern metaphysical discourse. His teachings through the Meditations have been both revered and scrutinized, and still have withstood many other’s attempts to disprove them. One of his biggest critics of the twentieth century was Gilbert Ryle. In his article entitled “Descartes’ Myth,” Ryle profusely attempts to debunk this purported falsehood. However, I would reason that he was not successful in his attempt. In this essay, I will argue how Ryle’s retort to Cartesian dualism is ridiculous and hardly convincing. The basis of my argument lies upon Ryle’s vain assertion that a “category-mistake” was made by Descartes, and also through his use of behaviourism. To begin this analysis, I will first lay out what Cartesian dualism is and what is meant by Ryle in his rebuttal. Following this, I will elaborate on my dispute with Ryle’s accusation of Descartes’ alleged category-mistake. Afterwards, I will debate his use of logical behaviourism, claiming instead that actions do not always define intentions.
The writer subscribes to the materialism school of thought. A human being is the mind itself because the mind starts operating whenever there is there is intellect of individuality. The mind originates from inside the brain and this makes the brain a tangible form of the mind. In my view, the brain and mind are inseparable if the brain is not there then the mind will also not be there. This is because when the mind is altered directly, the intellect is also affected. The mind also shapes the brain because what the brain only does is to reflect what is going on in the human mind.
Are minds physical things, or are they nonmaterial? If your beliefs and desires are caused by physical events outside of yourself, how can it be true that you act the way you do of your own free will? Are people genuinely moved by the welfare of others, or is all behavior, in reality, selfish? (Sober 203). These are questions relevant to philosophy of the mind and discussed through a variety of arguments. Two of the most important arguments with this discussion are Cartesian dualism and logical behaviorism, both of which argue the philosophy of the mind in two completely different ways. Robert Lane, a professor at the University of West Georgia, define the two as follows: Cartesian dualism is the theory that the mind and body are two totally different things, capable of existing separately, and logical behaviorism is the theory that our talk about beliefs, desires, and pains is not talk about ghostly or physical inner episodes, but instead about actual and potential patterns of behavior. Understanding of the two arguments is essential to interpret the decision making process; although dualism and behaviorism are prominent arguments for the philosophy of the mind, both have their strengths and weaknesses.
While the great philosophical distinction between mind and body in western thought can be traced to the Greeks, it is to the influential work of René Descartes, French mathematician, philosopher, and physiologist, that we owe the first systematic account of the mind/body relationship. As the 19th century progressed, the problem of the relationship of mind to brain became ever more pressing.
Mead, G. H. 1934. Mind, self and society and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Vygotsky, L.S. (1978) Mind in Society: The development of higher mental processes, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
Speculations on the origin of the mind have ranged from ghosts to society. Each new theory brings about more speculation and disagreement than the last. Where the mind resides, where it came from and if the brain has any involvement with the concept are common questions that fuel theory paradigms. Those questions are also the foundation of the debate about the roll of experience versus the existence of innate capacities. Steven Pinker theorizes the mind as a computing system created by the brain to fill the gap between innate capacities and capacities missing using common sense and learned critical thinking skills.
But, “human persons have an ‘inner’ dimension that is just as important as the ‘outer’ embodiment” (Cortez, 71). The “inner” element cannot be wholly explained by the “outer” embodiment, but it does give rise to inimitable facets of the human life, such as human dignity and personal identity. The mind-body problem entails two theories, dualism and physicalism. Dualism contends that distinct mental and physical realms exist, and they both must be taken into account. Its counterpart (weak) physicalism views the human as being completely bodily and physical, encompassing no non-physical, or spiritual, substances.
Vygotsky, L. (1978). Mind In Society:the development of higher psychological processes. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press.
Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind (1949) is a critique of the notion that the mind is distinct from the body, and is a rejection of the philosophical theory that mental states are distinct from physical states. Ryle argues that the traditional approach to the relation of mind and body (i.e., the approach which is taken by the philosophy of Descartes) assumes that there is a basic distinction between Mind and Matter. According to Ryle, this assumption is a basic 'category-mistake,' because it attempts to analyze the relation betwen 'mind' and 'body' as if they were terms of the same logical category. Furthermore, Ryle argues that traditional Idealism makes a basic 'category-mistake' by trying to reduce physical reality to the same status as mental reality, and that Materialism makes a basic 'category-mistake' by trying to reduce mental reality to the same status as physical reality.