Max Weber's View on Social Science Max Weber thought that "statements of fact are one thing, statements of value another, and any confusing of the two is impermissible," Ralf Dahrendorf writes in his essay "Max Weber and Modern Social Science" as he acknowledges that Weber clarified the difference between pronouncements of fact and of value. 1 Although Dahrendorf goes on to note the ambiguities in Weber's writings between factual analysis and value-influenced pronouncements, he stops short of offering an explanation for them other than to say that Weber, being human, could not always live with his own demands for objectivity. Indeed, Dahrendorf leaves unclear exactly what Weber's view of objectivity was. More specifically, Dahrendorf does not venture to lay out a detailed explanation of whether Weber believed that the social scientist could eliminate the influence of values from the analysis of facts. Did Weber believe that, even though facts are one thing and values another, social and economic facts could be evaluated without the analysis being influenced by values? And what is the relation of objectivity to values? Could objectivity, for instance, be used to show that one value is superior to another? Or does objectivity apply only to the analysis of facts? Do one's values or perspective stem from human nature, metaphysical views, personal identity, or is it just as likely that they are a mere construct of culture? These questions, and others like them, underlie much that has been considered ambiguous in Max Weber's writings: His methodology. Since his death, sociologists and political scientists have been disputing where Weber stood with regard to questions concerning the relationship of objectivity to facts and v... ... middle of paper ... .... 21 Weber: Political Writings, "The Profession and Vocation of Politics," p. 355. 22 Portis, Max Weber and Political Commitment, p. 15. 23 Rogers Brubaker, The Limits of Rationality: An Essay on the Social and Moral Thought of Max Weber (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), pp. 5 and 6. 24 Portis, Max Weber and Political Commitment, p. 71. 25 Portis, Max Weber and Political Commitment, p. 72, quoting Weber from The Methodology of Social Sciences, trans. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949), p. 72. 26 Weber: Political Writings, "The Profession and Vocation of Politics," p. 354. 27 Brubaker, The Limits of Rationality , p. 54. 28 Portis, Max Weber and Political Commitment , p. 71. 29 ibid. p. 9. 30 ibid. p. 10. 31 ibid. p. 10. 32 Weber: Political Writings, "The Nation State and Economic Policy," p. 19.
In John Ludwig Mackie’s book Inventing Right and Wrong, he claims that “in making moral judgments we are pointing to something objectively prescriptive, but that these judgments are all false”. By saying this, he supports his main point that there are no objective values. However, John McDowell will be against Mackie’s argument, for he suggests that besides primary qualities, there are also secondary qualities that can be objective. I hold the same viewpoint as McDowell’s. In this essay, I will firstly explain Mackie’s argument, then illustrate McDowell’s objections, and finally explore some potential responses by Mackie.
1b. Provide an analysis of pages 298-303 (starting at […] on 298 and ending at “employer’s organized life. […]”) of Weber’s “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism” in the Calhoun reader. Identity with specific reference to the text what is the key argument that Weber develops in this section.
Walter M. Simon The American Political Science Review , Vol. 45, No. 2 (Jun., 1951), pp. 386-399
The second section will evaluate Weber’s critique of the EOC concerning the ideological dogmatism that it precipitates, arguing that despite his opposition Weber does not wholeheartedly contest the idea of an ideologically driven political
Leiter, Brian. “Nietzsche’s Moral and Political Philosophy.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, CSLI, Stanford University, 26 August 2004.
Max Weber and Karl Marx, two prolific Sociologists who share different views with the origins and development of modern capitalism. They wanted to understand the rise of capitalism, the causes of it, as well as the direction it was heading. As they started to dissect capitalism they developed two separate conclusions generated from completely different factors. It’s hard to fathom the fact that Weber and Marx could arrive at two distinct conclusions while studying a similar event. They took two separate angles of approach, which caused them to have to opposing theories. Due too Weber and Marx approaching capitalism from different angles, their views of the dynamics, and the understanding of the origins differed.
Weber, Max. [1991] 1918. “Politics as a Vocation,” In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2004. Romance, Joseph. Political Science 6 class lectures. Drew University, Summer 2004.
Shortell, Timothy. "Weber's Theory of Social Class." Weber's Theory of Social Class. Brooklyn College, n.d. Web.
During his examination of Common Sense Morality, Sidgwick puts forth a series of propositions he believes pass his tests for achieving the highest possible certainty. Additionally, these axioms provide the bases of his argument for the adoption of Utilitarianism. Arguably the most important of these axioms is the third, which holds that “the good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view... of the Universe, than the good of any other; unless, that is, there are special grounds for believing that more good is likely to be realised in the one case than in the other.” What Sidgwick meant by the “point of view of the universe” is not explained in the methods, though in a later paper he suggests that it is “what all rational beings, as such, ought to aim at realizing.” By this, I tak...
Cahn, Steven M.. Political philosophy: the essential texts. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Print.
Strauss, Leo, and Joseph Cropsey. History of Political Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
Weber destabilizes the relationship between base and superstructure that Marx had established. According to Weber, the concept of historical materialism is naïve and nonsense because superstructures are not mere reflections of the economic base. (“The Protestant Ethic” and “The Spirit of Capitalism (1904-5) Weber agrees that the economy is one of the most faithful forces in modern life. However there are other social and legal factors which exhibit power and thus influence society. These factors help define bureaucratic society or Weber’s concept of modern society which operates through the rational administration of labor. According to Weber, the condition of modern society is disenchantment, which, through rationalization (division of labor), worldly activity is no longer motivated by cultural or spiritual values (meaning) but is instead motivated by economic impulsion. Ironically though, Weber attributes religious aestheticism (meaning) to the root of rationalization, and once mechanism (capitalism) takes off on its own, that religious root is no longer needed to justify work. Thus, mechanized petrification emerges, leaving hardly any room for spontaneity, with a few exceptions. In establishing a definition of modern society, Weber, unlike Marx, acknowledges that certain ideas can have great influence on material conditions. He suggests a more complex, dynamic relationship between economy and superstructure. Human activity is motivated by reasons other than just capitalist consumption. For example, many people act based on meaning, such as religious or spiritual. Values shape how people live. Weber accuses Marx of being an economic determinist for believing that the mode of production is the only force that moves the base. Weber believes that social and legal factors such as status, class, party, and the division of social honor from economic order in addition to the economy influence modern society, which, according to Weber, is a bureaucracy organized through the rational administration of labor. Weber believes that human history has been the progressive rationalization of life (modernity). The increased rationalism (measuring/controlling the labor process, ie: assembly line) based on logic and calculations instead of traditions, heart, and feeling of modernity le...
Jones, W. T. Masters of Political Thought. Ed. Edward, McChesner, and Sait. Vol. 2. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1947.
• Mill, John Stuart, Utilitarianism, Hackett Publishing Company Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana, 1979, Original Publication, 1861