Locke Primary And Secondary Qualities Analysis

1260 Words3 Pages

Is it true (as Locke argues) that you can completely remove a thing's secondary qualities, but that its primary qualities can only be changed, not wholly removed? Consider this question alongside Locke's claim that secondary qualities are powers in objects to cause sensations in perceivers. What consequences does your answer have for Locke's attempt to draw a distinction between primary and secondary qualities?
Locke on Primary and Secondary Qualities

Locke, an indirect realist, explores our immediate perceptions and with this attempts to draw a line between ideas and qualities, just how these are different entities. Sometimes referred to as Representative Theory, according to Locke, we are aware only of our ideas, these being things existing “in our minds”, sensations created. Our perceptions are indirect and their qualities, these are the causal properties of physical objects that then cause those sensations. This dualistic account of perception is one Berkeley disagrees with; however Locke’s distinctions are not particularly accurate enough to entirely agree with.

Yes, there are terms to agree with that an item’s secondary qualities can be removed, as these qualities are defined by Locke, to not be attached to the actual item and its existence. Take an apple for example; the apple will always stay the spherical shape it maintains. However my experience of it being green can be removed, especially if I see it to be different to someone else. To argue whether a primary quality can be wholly removed is another matter as it is difficult to distinguish whether it can be done so as these qualities live in the object itself. To deliberate if a quality can be completely removed, we must look at what we define each quality to entai...

... middle of paper ...

... and secondary, therefore they can proceed to be wholly removed.

These secondary features have an existence no less solid and objective than primary qualities.

Berkeley ‘Secondary qualities exist only in the mind’
This statement can be refuted to the logic that ideas exist only in our minds, with the qualities being the power in the objects to project these ideas. Then the definition of qualities follows as it existing in the objects, not elsewhere.
Discussing secondary qualities, they exist in the sense that objects enable us to produce sensations of taste, smell, touch, etc. however scientific explanation suggests otherwise telling us that these sensations have been produced by these microscopic particles out of which everything is composed of. This could infer that secondary qualities are not experiences and are of the same composure as primary, vice versa.

Open Document