Henry Kissinger’s March 5th op-ed in the Washington Post was an attempt to influence policy toward the ongoing Ukraine crisis. The former secretary of state and decorated academic offered poignant insights and observations of the crisis and those involved. At a time when many opinion makers and influencers are sabre rattling, calling for confrontation with Russia, Kissinger adopted an opposing view, arguing for cooperation instead. The argument he formulates is served well by techniques of argumentation introduced by Chaim Perelman.
Kissinger uses facts and presumptions to support truths that form the basis of his argument. He relies on historical precedents of the US’s military failures to suggest that outcomes are the most important consideration in developing policy.
Once Kissinger has this truth to form the foundation of his argument, he introduced his major claim: that the crisis is an opportunity to achieve greater cooperation between the west and Russia. This is not only his thesis, but it also establishes a loci of the preferable wherein greater cooperation between global powers is deemed more valuable than confrontation.
Kissinger makes use of Perelman’s modes of emphasis to strengthen his argument. He goes over each of the involved countries’ policies to establish that all are in some way at fault for their current predicament. He gives presence to the competition between the US and Russia in the geopolitical world by juxtaposing them in paragraphs eight and nine. He also spreads out his critiques of these countries’ conduct throughout the argument, using them in his liaisons.
These liaisons tie Kissinger’s starting point (policy needs to focus on outcomes) to his thesis (the outcome needs to foster greater cooperati...
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... failures of these nations as well as their responsibility to affect resolution of this conflict by adopting smarter policy.
The final liaison allows Kissinger to offer principles that should guide the handling of the crisis. His suggestions are aimed at producing an amenable outcome for all parties involved. Kissinger calls this “balanced dissatisfaction” that could slow the momentum moving everyone toward confrontation, an outcome he does not desire at all.
Kissinger departs from the Perelman model at the end of his argument where he appears to suggest that confrontation with Russia is inevitable. It is hard to tell why Kissinger ends his article this way because the tone seemed opposed to confrontation up to that point. Perelman’s model would have an arguer defeat the opposing viewpoint. Adopting the opposing viewpoint appears to weaken Kissinger’s argument.
...as formed certain signals and understandings that are critical to our prospects for cooperation and negotiation today (Skyrms 80-104).
In a recent White House brief, President Obama called the Russian invasion of Crimea a clear violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and international law. When assessing the Russo-Ukrainian crises in Crimea, the commander of European Command (EUCOM) and the Supreme Allied Commander of European Forces (SACUER) must account for U.S. interests in the region before deciding a proper course of action. This essay aims to assess four of the United States’ national interests through the perspective of EUCOM and SACUER. The first section will outline the role of EUCOM and SACUER in the European region and assess the overall problem of Russia invading Crimea. The second section will outline four of the United States’ national interests at stake: international order, trade and economic prosperity, energy supply, and freedom of the seas. In doing so, this assessment of U.S. interests in Crimea supports the options of non-intervention and a non-provocative stance in order to maintain long-term stability because the Russian invasion has only violated peripheral interests of EUCOM and SACUER.
Gaddis, John Lewis. We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War: Dividing the World. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997. Publishing.
The information war between the West and Russia had intensified once again and reached levels higher than the levels of Russo-Georgia war (2008). Russian media naturally is defending its annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol as a democratic referendum and justifying the military intervention as the protection of rights of the Russian population of Crimea. The referendum was very controversial since it had an unusually high voter turnout and the Pro-Russian vote has created speculations that the referendum has been falsified by the Russian government. The Western media condemns Russia for the anne...
Khrushchev’s finally accepts the proposal the of removing Soviet missiles out of Cuba in exchange for United States removing its missiles from Turkey in a few months. Perhaps Khrushchev’s acquiescence can be explained by the political-bargaining model, which predicts that parties involved in a disagreement, where the states are incredibly high, would be motivated to take any necessary steps via a bargaining process to reach a resolution.
Discussions of the causes of the Cold War are often divisive, creating disparate ideological camps that focus the blame in different directions depending on the academic’s political disposition. One popular argument places the blame largely on the American people, whose emphasis on “strength over compromise” and their deployment of the atomic bomb in the Second World War’s Pacific theatre apparently functioned as two key catalysts to the conflict between US and Soviet powers. This revisionist approach minimizes Stalin’s forceful approach and history of violent leadership throughout World War 2, and focuses instead on President Harry Truman’s apparent insensitivity to “reasonable Soviet security anxieties” in his quest to impose “American interests on the world.” Revisionist historians depict President Truman as a “Cold War monger,” whose unjustified political use of the atomic bomb and ornery diplomatic style forced Russia into the Cold War to oppose the spread of a looming capitalist democratic monopoly. In reality, Truman’s responsibility for the Cold War and the atomic bomb drop should be minimized.
It is the inquisitive nature of man that is primary driving force behind the Five W’s: Who, What, When, Where and Why. Though these are all meaningful pursuits in their own right, it is the purpose of this piece to shed light on the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union’s purpose, as well as the most likely causes for its manifestation. Also in question, but not out of the scope of discussion, is whether or not non-aggression pacts truly work to preserve peace, or whether they are unintentionally one of the primary fuel sources that combust to cause war amongst the nations involved. The realist holds the key to this argument. The realist perspective sits alone as being the most concise angle from which to view the events transpired. However, without understanding a bulk of the history, a moderately concise answer cannot be delivered to the reader.
4. Zinn disputes Kissinger's statement because in Kissinger's book, he discusses how from the viewpoint of the leaders of nineteenth century Europe that everything was peaceful but he ignores the working class and those who suffered from the decisions made by these leaders. Kissinger claims that "peace" had been restored in Europe, but for the lower classes, everything was far from peaceful.
One must wonder; what was Kissinger’s motive? Being pushed by “his boss” President Nixon to prevent communism in Chile at all costs is apparent, as is his friendly relationship with Pinochet that he developed. “I want to see our relations and friendship improve,” Kissinger states in a memoir to Pinochet during his trip to Chile that was intended to speak about human rights concerns (Kornbluh 1999; page 5). But what was truly the underlining motivation that caused Kissinger to risk his job and reputation to keep Pinochet in power? Could it simply be a lack of sympathy? Or was Kissinger just overly fanatical about stopping the spread of Communism?
Richard Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, were fully aware of the reality and “waged” détente vigorously to gain advantage in the global competition with the Soviet Union. They did not acknowledge the fact, however, and could not control conflicting public reaction when the Soviet leaders desired to do the same, both by intervening in the third world and by keeping up the arms race. Blame was associated not only to the Soviet leaders but also to the policy of détente, especially in the Ford and Carter
Failure of the Détente Between the Superpowers The French word ‘détente’, which the Oxford English Dictionary describes as “the easing of strained relations, especially in a political situation” (www.oed.com), first appeared in this context when a German newspaper used it to describe the visit of a British monarch at the beginning of the 20th century (Froman, 1991). In this essay, I will attempt to explain the cold war détente between the superpowers of the USA and the USSR in the 1970’s, concentrating first on its positive developments between 1971 and 1973 and then on the events that lead to its ultimate failure, symbolised by the soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The first real steps of relaxation of tensions were taken with the Moscow summit and the signing of the SALT 1 (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks) agreement in May 1972. The SALT agreement was a staring point for attempts to control nuclear arms, to restrict the impact and spread of nuclear weapons and to secure a balance due to ‘Mutual Assured Destruction’ (the notion that a nuclear attack from one side would lead to a retaliation from the other and therefore both sides would be greatly damaged) between the two superpowers and were to be followed up by further arms limitations talks within the next five years (Kent and Young, 2004). Also, agreements were reached on lowering the risk of accidental confrontation and on cooperation in science, health and environmental issues.
[2] Weaver, Matthew. "Ukraine Crisis." The Guardian. N.p., 20 Feb. 2014. Web. 7 Mar. 2014. .
Nye, Jr., Joseph S. “Hard and Soft Power in American Foreign Policy.” In Paradox of American Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 4-17. Print.
Lafeber, W. (2002), America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2000. 9th edn. New-York: McGraw-Hill Higher Education.
The conflict between the Ukraine and Russia is the Ukraine's most long-standing and deadly crisis; since its post-Soviet independence began as a protest against the government dropping plans to forge closer trade ties with the European Union. The conflict between Russia and the Ukraine stems from more than twenty years of weak governance, the government’s inability to promote a coherent executive branch policy, an economy dominated by oligarchs and rife with corruption, heavy reliance on Russia, and distinct differences between Ukraine's population from both Eastern and Western regions in terms of linguistics, religion and ethnicity (Lucas 2009).