For an example, consider two alternative belief systems A and B consisting of beliefs A1, A2 and B1, B2 respectively. There are two beliefs in each system none of which can justify themselves alone. If A1 → A2 and A2 → A1, then there are 2 inferential connections in A and a high inferential density. Bonjour says this makes A likely. However, if only B1 → B2 and not vice versa, then there is only 1 non-mutual inferential connection in B and thus a low inferential density. Bonjour suggests that lack of mutual justification makes the whole system of B unjustified since B1 must act foundationally.
From this example, we can see that the coherence of a system is defined to be inversely related to the number of beliefs in the system and proportional to the number of relations within the system. Formally, Bonjour defines coherence by dividing it into five “coherence criteria” such that:
1. A system of beliefs is coherent only if it is logically consistent.
2. A system of beliefs is coherent in proportion to its degree of probabilistic consistency.
3. The coherence of a system of beliefs is increased by the presence of inferential connections between its component beliefs and increased in proportion to the number and strength of such connections.
4. The coherence of a system of beliefs is diminished to the extent to which it is divided into subsystems of beliefs which are relatively unconnected to each other by inferential connections.
5. The coherence of a system of beliefs is decreased in proportion to the presence of unexplained anomalies in the believed content of the system.
Though some facets of this definition are perhaps vague, it is still more precise than McGrew's account. In theory, Bonjour suggests, this non-foundational ...
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...rks. One should note that fictional stories may be logically self consistent and might even include vast universes of beliefs that may be coherent to an extreme degree. For example, take JRR Tolkien's lord of the rings series, a cannon complete with self-consistent accounts of history, language, culture, characters, and universal properties. We may want to say that an account of Frodo Baggins taking the one ring to Mount Doom is purely false though belief in such an account might be considered inferentially dense. Unfortunately, if we want to avoid this issue, we must have a foundational understanding of why this account does not match the external world. A non-foundational Coherent account of justification would suggest that believing in this fictional account might be justified, though clearly it is not. This problem poses a real concern when we analyze religious
The underlying paradox of irrationality, from which no theory can entirely escape, is this: if we explain it too well, we turn it into a concealed form of rationality; while if we assign incoherence too glibly, we merely compromise our ability to diagnose irrationality by withdrawing the background of rationality needed to justify any diagnosis at all. (1)
The term justified belief refers to belief that is formed by the existence of proper evidence and logic. William K Clifford tells us of a story of a ship owner and deaths caused by his unjustified beliefs.
The Raven paradox includes three plausible premises, and derives from them a fairly implausible-looking conclusion about the confirmation of generalizations.
In “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”, Thomas Kelly gives two responses to the question “How should awareness of disagreement, with those that you take to be your epistemic equal, effect the rational confidence you have in your beliefs?”. Kelly discusses two possible responses to the question. The first is Richard Foley's first person perspective argument. Adam Elga calls the second the right reasons view (Elga, 2007 pg. 485). Kelly pursues the latter, and does not go further than agreeing with Foley that we should only view these disputes with a first person perspective.
a new system of knowledge that is free of prior prejudices for establishing the truth of
In “The Fixation of Belief”, Charles S. Peirce attempts to explain his four methods of establishing belief, in which he says all people have. These methods can be put to the test with any subject matter, and one shall always fit.
hat for a belief to be true knowledge, it must be supported by evidence. Evidentialism also claims
Apply ONE theory of the causes of political conflicts to ONE real-world case of conflict to help explain why/how the conflict occurred.
Alexander, J., & Weinberg, J. (2009, January 1). The "Unreliability" of Epistemic Intuitions . . Retrieved May 2, 2014, from http://www.siena.edu/uploadedfiles/home/academics/schools_and_departments/school_of_liberal_arts/philosophy/Alexander%20&%20Weinberg.The%20Unreliability%20of%20Epistemic%20Intuitions.pdf
Coherentism has not gain much recognition throughout the history of philosophy. According to the traditional definition of knowledge, knowledge is Justified True Belief. Hence, one must first justify their belief before they can acquire any knowledge. Since most of the time the knowledge we assume we have justified are beliefs that are justified based on other belief. Consequently, this promotes the concept of regress argument where the philosophers are on the quest to understand how a belief is justified. Coherentist attempts to solve the regress problem by suggesting a system of beliefs where the justification is done by referring to other beliefs within the relevant system. In this essay, I will be focused on two of the main objections to coherentism: isolation and alternative objection. While at the same time examines the concept of coherentism to determine
In response, they proposed that perception is based on the organization of stimuli into holistic and meaningful forms. They are well-known for the phrase "the whole is different than the sum of its parts. " They proposed several "laws" (really heuristics or "rules of thumb") that are referred to as the Gestalt laws of perceptual organization. These are discussed in the module later on.
Elbow had experienced that continuing to believe there can be connections made of fleeting, distracted thoughts to be only detrimental. Therefore, coherency must be set aside as a
In this situation, there is no “logical universe” that helps to justify a belief, but rather shows perspectives that are common in everyday life. This basically explains the set of rules that individuals go by to have a more practical and normal life. An individual would learn that the situation they may go through is not based on correspondence between a belief and a fact in society, but coherence between a belief and other beliefs in a single individual. In other words, the exposed truth is a property of other congruent beliefs one has thought in their minds before experiencing something in the present. This is the coherence theory of justification; when something is signified as true with this justification, then this strongly has the official truth even if the opposing individual argues.
Some of the objections, such as the ones made by Edmund Gettier, claim that three conditions are not nearly enough to justify a true belief, and that at the very least a fourth must be added. Gettier presents a very valid criticism of the JTB theory of knowledge, and his counter examples highlight flaws in the JTB theory that make it an inadequate theory of knowledge. Gettier claims takes an issue with the third part of the JTB theory, which states that proposition P must be true. Gettier makes the interesting observation that person S may very well be justified in believing in proposition P even if P is false
Every fact has an explanation: there are no inexplicable facts. There is a reason (or cause) for everything. For every existence and non-existence things there must be assigned a cause, or reason. For example, if a tree exists, there must be a reason or cause why it exists; but if it doesn’t exist, there must also be a reason or cause which prevents it from existing, or which takes its existence away.