How Does Mearsheimer Prove The Validity Of Offensive Realism

Josef Korbel School of International Studies

Mearsheimer’s Work

INTS4700 U.S. Foreign Policy

Richa Bhatia

8/18/2014

The realist school of thought is not particularly an optimistic one. Realist scholars see the world as a place where conflict is inevitable and overall possess a deep suspicion for lasting peace and cooperation. Mearsheimer comes from the realist school of thought as a well-educated, well-read scholar, and with The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, brings his own theory of offensive realism to the table. This book was written after the end of the Cold War, when constructivism and liberalism were publicly accepted than realism, and Mearsheimer’s book brings his readers crashing firmly back to his reality of the world.

Mearsheimer

He illustrates the fear and uncertainty within the great powers by citing the reaction of the UK and France towards a reunified Germany. He states that despite these powers having been ‘close allies for almost forty-five years’, both worried about the dangers of the newly reunified nation due to its increase in power. This dynamic shift in thinking characterizes the offensive realist mindset of states, or so Mearsheimer claims. He also cites the foreign policy of behavior of Japan, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Italy as further examples of states seeking to shift the balance of power in their favor, some, i.e. Germany and Japan, even seeking regional hegemony. In the case of Imperial Japan, Mearsheimer cites Japanese aggression in China and northern Indochina and the attack on Pearl Harbor as cases of state aggression. The United States, perhaps for the water boundary reasoning Mearsheimer mentions, did not consider Japan a functional enemy until after the attack on Pearl Harbor, after which the US changed its tactics to decrease Japan’s power. The immediate shift in thinking towards Japan after Pearl Harbor demonstrates the security dilemma, as well as a proper realist response to

There are sections in the book that account for counterarguments, but other times, Mearsheimer blithely assumes the reader is in agreement. In the claim Mearsheimer presents about the UK and France fearing a reunited Germany, he does not make note of the domestic politics within reunited Germany that could have also spurred this change in reaction. The socio-economic differences within the eastern and western halves of the country were enough to scare West Germans into proclaiming reunification a ‘disaster’, let alone the UK and France. Mearsheimer simply brushes the UK and France’s reactions off as state fears of a reunified Germany with military capabilities. However, in the case of China, Mearsheimer delves much deeper into the domestic politics and thought process of the Chinese governmental leadership, giving that particular argument greater depth than his claims about German reunification. His chapter about China’s rise logically shows the breadth of the situation and makes it clear why the United States could never tolerate a rising China. The breadth of the last chapter, however impressive, showcases one of the flaws of realist scholars, who selectively regard and disregard domestic politics to suit their argumentative needs. Mearsheimer is not immune to this