Goldman's Causal Theory Of Existence Analysis

1531 Words4 Pages

There is no substantial difference between Goldman's Causal theory of knowing and the Nyaya account of knowledge and neither of them fully satisfy the distinction between believing a thing and knowing a thing.

Goldman's requirement that we must have a causal connection explaining that some proposition is true and one's believing that a proposition is true is required to avert the Gettier problems, according to Goldman. “Jones owns a Ford” is a proposition which Goldman makes in an example that he uses to explain how this causal connection is required in order to avoid the Gettier problem. In the example he lays out a disjunction which says that Smith, the believing person, believes that “Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona”. …show more content…

The example he gives is that of a fire in his fireplace to which he could infer that there was smoke coming from his chimney. “I know that smoke was coming out of my chimney last night. I know this because I remember perceiving a fire in my fireplace last night, and I infer that the fire caused smoke to rise out of the chimney.” This all assumes that there is no backward causation. “The analysis requires that there be a causal connection between p and S's belief, not necessarily that p be a cause of S's belief. p and S's belief of p can also be causally connected in a way that yields knowledge if both p and S's belief of p have a common cause.” This comes down to weakening causal relations between a knowledge event and one's belief in the event so as to include examples in which an event and one's belief in the event are causally related. This is to say that there can be a causal relation between fire and smoke being produced, from past experience, the fact that if one sees a fire in a fireplace they can then use the prior causal connection of seeing smoke coming from fire and conclude that this fire is also producing smoke and in short it is venting out of the …show more content…

In other words, if the premises are true, then the conclusion would follow. Either one owns a Ford, is in Barcelona, has smoke coming from their chimney etc. or they do not. In any case there are way that one can be wrong or another would have cause to belief that they are wrong and in both cases it is only a belief that they are right, not knowledge. So, the premises can not be proven beyond a doubt and are thus not knowledge. In every case of a proposition there is some presupposition. To say “I” presupposes that one thing is separate from other things, that external things exist etc. I propose that in such cases, one can say that they have propositionally conditioned knowledge. If a thing is definitionally or tautologically true (Av~A) then and only then can they have what most call “knowledge”.

If one holds that such a position would limit what we know to too great a degree, I would have to say that if I am right then what can they do about it. If the premises are true and we do not know many things but rather believe many things only then that is the state of the world and there is nothing that they can do to change the facts. From a practical stance, however, believing things from logical deduction or inference does not mean that they do not work for us most of the time. Maybe truth-hitting would be better explained as being close enough to the truth to work in a practical

Open Document