Against the Fission Argument
Introduction
Parfit defines fission as a process of transferring part of an individual’s brain into another body while the other half of the brain is kept alive and put in another body. He suggests that when this process takes place, an occurrence of three possibilities may take place: an individual may not survive; and individual may survive as one of the two individuals in two different bodies; or an individual may survive as both “in that the individual has two bodies and a mind that is divided” (Loux 375). Parfit thinks that each of these three possibilities should be rejected. Moreover, he wants to refute that for any question concerning the survival of personal identity in the fission process, there should
…show more content…
Direct connections include intention, memory, and continuity of desire and belief. The connection of “psychological continuity” and “psychological connectedness” provides a foundation for the psychological account of an individual’s identity (Parfit 207). The psychological connection can be explained in a simple way. Let us create two individuals called Y1 and Y2 from one individual called X. Individual X is psychologically connected to individual Y1 and Y2, where there connection is called …show more content…
This implies that in case the process of fission is successful and part of a person’s brain is transferred to another body, the personal identity will disappear because part of the brain will not be present. However, personal identity is an important part of a human being’s life when it comes to survival because a person’s identity is made up of both part of the brain. His fission argument is unrealistic because transferring part of an individual’s brain into another body is medically impossible. Any attempt to transfer an individual’s brain to another body as seen in the discussion will cause damage to the upper functions of the brain. Also, if the procedure of transferring part of an individual’s brain into another body is successful, it is possible that the part of the brain left behind in the original body will not survive. What makes the loss of personal identity possible is the lack of psychological connectedness in fission. The two brain parts in different bodies are not connected to a single body that can make sense of the conscience that is left in an individual’s body or in the transferred body.
Conclusion
Parfit’s fission argument may be conceivable in a situation where an individual’s part of the brain is successfully transferred to another body. However, as seen in the discussion, the personal identity of an individual
The only logical conclusion to derive from this observation is that what we consider to be ourselves is not our bodies. As a result, an individual’s personal identity cannot be rooted in just his or her body, unlike what body theorists would like to
Although the concept of identity is recurrent in our daily lives, it has interpreted in various ways.
As an extension to the short story “Where am I?” by Daniel Dennett, Dennett is taking the government to court, claiming that NASA owes him a new body, because he is currently forced to share his body with another person (Hubert). Wanting to make usage of my philosophical expertise, the government called upon me to give my recommendation to the court as to what validity, if any Dennett’s claim has, and whether or not Dennett should be awarded a second body transplant. After careful consideration on various philosophical issues pertaining to this case, I have concluded that there is absolutely some merit to Dennett’s claim, and that Daniel Dennett should be given a new body. I will expand upon the details of each specific issue that I investigated,
The purpose of this paper is to explore Locke's account of personal identity and show that critics of Locke's account wrongfully advocate for an interpretation that equates consciousness to memory. Section one of this paper will discuss Locke's account of personal identity as it appears in the text. Followed by section two which will discuss traditional interpretations of Locke's account which equate memory with consciousness. Section two will draw mainly on Thomas Reids "Gallant Officer argument. Finally, section three will reflect on the first two sections and argue why the memory criterion is wrong.
In David Lewis’ article “An Argument for Identity Theory” Lewis defends the psychoneural identity theory, arguing that mental states or experiences are neural states. In his main argument, he argues that physics can explain the causal relationship between mental states or experiences and physical phenomena. He uses an analogy of a cylindrical combination lock to explain the causal role that mental states play in producing physical phenomena. In order to put the lock into a state of being “unlocked”
It is thus believed that the person has through this indoctrination process undergone a metamorphosis that has led to him/her becoming a “robot” like being that has effectively been stripped of the ability of independent functioning and the power of critical reasoning thereby effectively leaving hi...
It states that there is more to a person than just a collection of memories. A person is also defined by their desires, motives and beliefs. There is clearly a distinction between someone who likes to fight with others. Simply put, for identical persons to be identical, they must share memories, as well as their personality and beliefs. To add on to that, identical persons must share a quasi-desire, which is a desire that is not tied to personal identity to escape redundancy. For a desire to be accepted without being circular, it can’t presuppose identity. A quasi-desire, similar to a quasi-memory, is an apparent desire that is caused by a real desire. For instance, a certain person has an aggressive and merciless attitude, which leads to certain desires. The apparent desires are indirectly connected with the deeper motives and beliefs of the person in question. The insufficiency objection ultimately leads to the creation of a new theory, the psychological continuity theory, why states that identical persons are identical if they directly quasi-remember and quasi-desire the same thing, they can be considered psychologically
Dissociative identity disorder, a condition that has plagued and altered the minds of those who were diagnosed for many years, represents the condition in which an individual displays multiple personalities that overpower his or her behavior around others and even alone. Such personalities or identities can have staggering differences between them even being characterized by a disparate gender, race, or age. One of the sides of them can even be animal-like and display feral qualities. Also, the disorder severs the connection between the victim’s sense of identity, emotions, actions, and even memories from their own consciousness. The cause for this is known to be a very traumatic experience that the person had gone through previously and fails to cope with it, thus they dissociate themselves from the memory in order to keep their mental state in one piece. All these results from the disorder do not begin to tell of the rest of the horrors that gnaw away at the affected human.
Various types of relationships may exist between the different personalities. Usually the individual alternates from one personality to the other, and can not remember in one, what happened in the other. Occasionally however while one personality is dominant and functions consciously, the other continues to function sub-consciously and is referred to the co conscious personality.
Mental disorders have baffled physicians, psychiatrists and the general public since the beginning of time. One particular disorder called Dissociative Identity Disorder, also known as Multiple Personality Disorder, has caused controversy between those who believe it is real and those who think it is purely part of an individual’s imagination. For those who believe strongly in its existence, it poses very real consequences and hardships. Dissociative Identity Disorder has many causes, symptoms, and treatments; unfortunately, those who don’t take it seriously use it as a scapegoat for others undiagnosed problems.
To some degree everyone is influenced by social identity, the theory composes the idea that the social world is divided into ...
What is personal identity? This question has been asked and debated by philosophers for centuries. The problem of personal identity is determining what conditions and qualities are necessary and sufficient for a person to exist as the same being at one time as another. Some think personal identity is physical, taking a materialistic perspective believing that bodily continuity or physicality is what makes a person a person with the view that even mental things are caused by some kind of physical occurrence. Others take a more idealist approach with the belief that mental continuity is the sole factor in establishing personal identity holding that physical things are just reflections of the mind. One more perspective on personal identity and the one I will attempt to explain and defend in this paper is that personal identity requires both physical and psychological continuity; my argument is as follows:
Sybil was a very important, and one of the most popular, accounts of Dissociative Identity. The book went into great detail about the suffering Sybil went through, and the lengths that her therapist took to try to validate the claim and treat her personalities, through verification with family members to visiting her childhood doctor. (Putnam). This account not only gave therapists a basis to compare their dissociative patients against, but also reopened the public’s eyes to this disorder. (Putnam 35). It was classified in The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in 1980, only six years after the books release. (Kihlstrom). Now there is some concern over the validity of this account, which only fuels the controversy more. There are still other studies of Dissociative Identity Disorder, such as The Five of Me (1977), The Three Faces of Eve (1957) and many other true case studies. The Three Faces of Eve was also a book turned into a movie that, so far, has been proven as a valid case. This case study was not as detailed as the case study on Sybil, but still is a true study of this disorder. (“Multiple Personality”)
Valde, G. (1996). Identity closure: A fifth identity status. The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 157(3), 245-254.
Thus, I believe in the presence of an immaterial self that governs the brain and the body. I disagree that “mental states are explainable in terms of physical brain states”. This is because mental states cannot be reduced to physical brain states. Physical brain states can only give rise to a definitive method to an outcome while immaterial thoughts of a mental state can give rise to various methods to an outcome. These immaterial thoughts of a mental state are made possible by the immaterial self.