The U.S. and NATO planners both have doctrine that defines the Center of Gravity (COG) concept making it a primary tool for planning their military operations. Integrating the two COG concepts is possible by understanding the similarities and differences of both. In each of their doctrine, AJP-5 for NATO and JP 5-0 for the U.S., both define COG with similarities; however there are some noticeable differences. The two doctrines agree that the COG is the “center of strength” or “the primary strength” and that there are both strategic and operational COGs (AJP-5, 2-32 & CPH, 63). The U.S. generally focuses on one COG and its critical factors being requirements, capabilities and vulnerabilities (CPH, 63). The vulnerabilities are where we generally
Strategy depends on numerous analytical factors and some of these present challenges to planners. This essay will identify some of these challenges that strategists encountered during WWII. Moreover, it will present strategy as a fluid process requiring refinement throughout.
Unified Land Operations defines the army operational design methodology (ADM) as “a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them. The operational design methodology incorporated into army doctrine serves as a method to compliment the military decision making process (MDMP). Although the ADM it is often confused with replacing MDMP, its purpose is to address complex problems from a nonlinear approach. ADM helps the commander to answer questions to problems. However, only a collaborative effort of an operation planning team (OPT) will achieve the approach to answering complex problems. Doctrine alone does not provide the answer to complex problems, but rather offers a guide to solve them. To conceptualize the MDMP, planners must incorporate ADM to provide a better understanding, visualization, and description of the problem. The purpose of this paper is to provide the framework to support why ADM is required in the MDMP.
Rudd’s (2009) essay evaluates Enid Blyton’s work offering a different perspective to account for the appeal and popularity of the author. This essay looks at the aspects raised by Rudd. How Blyton, Pullman and Ransom illustrate the different aspects of a good or a bad book. The way critics confer prestige on a book or author and the arising criticism. How the agenda of the committees affects the selection of prize-winners. Finally, looking at the factors involved in success.
War finds success and failure inescapably linked to how well the Combined, Joint, and Multinational Commander ensures the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment” planning is linked to strategic, operational and tactical objectives. General Eisenhower’s Operation OVERLORD, the Allied cross channel, air, and seaborne invasion of France during World War II provides an excellent case study to show successful integration of the principles and the spirit of the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment.” OVERLORD required synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating the logistics capabilities of coalition forces, their equipment as well as civilian manufacturing capabilities to meet the strategic end state (e.g. the defeat of Germany). This article will review the purpose and definition of Joint Sustainment, its imperatives and logistics planning principles and examine how Eisenhower and his planners incorporated these imperatives and principles into Operation OVERLORD.
1. Critique the German Army Group G Commander’s efforts to balance the operational factors in achieving assigned objective(s) and protecting the German operational COG against the dual threat of the FFI and the anticipated Allied amphibious assault.
The United States has endured numerous security breaches and high security threats over the past two decades. After the attacks on 9/11, the office of Intelligence became a vital source in retrieving sensitive data and tracking down potential terrorists and their networks which could pose a threat to the American people and then forwarding that vital information to the Department of Homeland Security and other government agencies. Intelligence became a key role in “assessing threats to critical American infrastructures, bio-and nuclear terrorism, pandemic diseases, threats to the borders to the nation, and radicalization within American society” (Randol, 2009, p. 7). The sharing of homeland security intelligence has become a precedence for Congress and the government. Our nation must be one step ahead of any potential terrorists that want to harm our turf. Within this text the capabilities and limitations of both domestic and foreign intelligence in supporting homeland security efforts will be explained;
Leaders today need to have an appreciation for the operation process, understand a situation, envision a desired future, and to lay out an approach that will achieve that future (Flynn & Schrankel, 2013). Plans need to be created that can be modified to changes in any factors considered. However, plans should not be dependent on specific information being precise or that require things to go exactly according to schedule. Instead, the staff NCO should be flexible where they can and always be prepared for the unexpected. Today’s military members are fighting an unconventional war in Iraq and Afghanistan. The enemy constantly changes their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP’s) to counter the United States technological advances, making planning very difficult for leaders. There are multiple tools at a staff NCO’s disposal to try to anticipate an outcome of a current operation, but also assist with the development of concepts in follow-on missions. The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is just one tool a staff NCO can utilize. In order to stay ahead of the enemy, create effective plans and orders, it is critical for a staff NCO to assist the commander, and understand that the MDMP and planning are essential in defeating the enemy and conserving the fighting force.
“Operational design is a journey of discovery, not a destination.” Operational design provides a framework, with the guidance of the Joint Force Commander (JFC), that staffs and planning groups can use to give political leaders, commanders, and warfighters a comprehensive understanding of the nature of the problems and objectives for which military forces will be committed, or are planned to be committed. Furthermore, operational design supports commanders and planners to make sense of complicated operational environments (often with ill-structured or wicked problems), helps to analyze wicked problem, and devise an operational approach to solve the problem in the context of the operational environment.
Evaluating threats to America’s national security is a challenge that is undertaken by academics, intelligence analysts, policy-makers, and anyone else with the patience. During the Cold War, America’s biggest concern was easy to define, the only other state capable of competing with America, the Soviet Union. Today, America faces threats from states, non-state actors, domestic groups, and even economic conditions. However, two states should always be kept in mind when discussing national security, China and Russia, with China being the biggest threat.
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
Kugler, Richard L. 1995. “Defence Program Requirements”. In NATO Enlargement: Opinions and Options, Jeffrey Simon (Ed), Washington D.C. National Defence University Press, Fort McNair, 184-207.
In today’s operational environments, the U.S. Army is facing a range of problems and mission sets that are arguably more complex than previously encountered. Forces face an array of demands that encompass geo-political, social, cultural, and military factors that interact in unpredictable ways. The inherent complexity of today’s operations has underscored the need for the Army to expand beyond its traditional approach to operational planning. In March 2010 in FM 5-0: The Operations
Obviously when talking about global security, there needs to actually be the security aspect of it. Such aspect comes from the military itself. The military’s role is to protect both the people of the public and private sectors. Due to this, the military can play the most important role of the three. With being the most important of the three, there also comes the time that needs to be put within it to make sure that this part can function at its maximum potential. Allowing the military to function at its maximum potential allows the public and private to feel at ease with their safety. This does not only constitute for the United States, but all over the entire
Geissmann, Hans J. 2001. “The Underrated OSCE” Working paper presented for Consultation on NATO Nuclear Policy, National Missile Defence & Alternative Security Arrangements in Ottowa, Canada. http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/WorkingPapers/Simons%20Conf%20Ottawa/Giessmann.html
The nation has become dependent on technology, furthermore, cyberspace. It’s encompassed in everything we deliver in our daily lives, our phones, internet, communication, purchases, entertainment, flying airplane, launching missiles, operating nuclear plants, and implicitly, our protection. The more ever-growing technology empower Americans, the more they become prey to cyber threats. The United States Executive Office of the President stated, “The President identified cybersecurity as one of the top priorities of his administration in doing so, directed a 60-day review to assess polices.” (United States Executive Office of the President, 2009, p.2). Furthermore, critical infrastructure, our network, and internet alike are identified as national assets upon which the administration will orchestrate integrated cybersecurity policies without infringing upon and protecting privacy. While protecting our infrastructure, personal privacy, and civil liberties, we have to keep in mind the private sector owns and operates the majority of our critical and digital infrastructure.