“The universe contains only material or physical entities”, this is what materialism holds. However, the greatest challenge that goes to materialists is that of offering a plausible account of mind in a purely physical term. Therefore, some seductive analysis of mind with pure physical explanation of mental status must be suggested by materialists. There are three main theories that have been formulated to explain these scenarios.
These theories include behaviorism, functionalism and the identity theory. Like in behaviorism the theory attempts to reduce mental states into real facts about behavioral dispositions. In functionalism, which is a more complex theory, particular functional roles and mental states are identified by these functionalists. They therefore deduce that, any state responsible for an appropriate functional role is considered as a mental state; therefore, the possibility of mind is realized in substance like artificial intelligence. Lastly, the mind brain identity theory which is mostly applied by the modern materialist’s deals with the state of the brain in trying to consider some physical states associated with the mental state. The main idea in this case is that mind and brain is one and the same thing.
Behaviorism theory
This theory attempts has been considered to reduce the state of mentality into behavior. The states of the mind are nothing other than behavioral dispositions, this is according to the theory. This can best be illustrated by circumstances whereby one accompanies him or herself with an umbrella, or remove clothes from the line, or even seek shelter just on the belief that it is raining, thus, the two situations are identical.
One of the setbacks with the theory is that distinctions involv...
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...brain processes are totally different such that mental states, in a sense, cannot be reduced to brain processes for it would make no sense to say that water can be reduced to a stone. In addition, mental states are over and above physical states.
In summary, it can be deduced that most philosophical discussions relating to materialism are normally, related to physicalism. Materialism belongs to the class monist ontology. In addition, ideas related to metaphysical naturalism and methodological naturalism are also inclusive in this content. The only philosophical alternatives to materialism are some forms of idealism, monism and dualism. However, there are some scientific rejections to materialism mostly emanating from the modern science writers and physicists whose scientific findings such as the chaos theory and quantum mechanics have openly disproven materialism.
Barbara Montero is an associate professor of philosophy at the City University of New York. In her article “Post-Physicalism” she aims to convince people, mainly physicalists, to begin thinking of the mind/body problem from a new perspective. Montero reasons that the term “physical” is too difficult a term to define, which leads to a serious flaw of the direction of physicalist arguments. Her main idea is that the mind/body problem is really the problem of finding a place for mentality in a fundamentally nonmental world, not a fundamentally physical world. Directing the question towards “Is mentality a fundamental feature of the world?”, in her opinion, relieves the conflict between naturalism and ontological significance, and paves the way
Behaviorist identify mental states with dispositions. A mental state is identical when, given the same inputs the disposition toward a particular output in the same. Unlike functionalism, behaviorism recognizes dispositions according to merely outward behavior. Alternatively, a functional system includes a typical behavioral outputs given a range of inputs, as well as a tendency to experience a property of a mental state. Functionalists want to individuate mental states causally, but since mental states have mental effects, functionalist advance on behaviorism by acknowledging some similar input and output systems have similar descriptions without entailing similar mental effects. Functionalism, as an advancement of behaviorism, also describes the function of the mental state.
The mind-body problem can be a difficult issue to discuss due to the many opinions and issues that linger. The main issue behind the mind-body problem is the question regarding if us humans are only made up of matter, or a combination of both matter and mind. If we consist of both, how can we justify the interaction between the two? A significant philosophical issue that has been depicted by many, there are many prominent stances on the mind-body problem. I believe property dualism is a strong philosophical position on the mind-body issue, which can be defended through the knowledge argument against physicalism, also refuted through the problems of interaction.
The desire to avoid dualism has been the driving motive behind much contemporary work on the mind-body problem. Gilbert Ryle made fun of it as the theory of 'the ghost in the machine', and various forms of behaviorism and materialism are designed to show that a place can be found for thoughts, sensations, feelings, and other mental phenomena in a purely physical world. But these theories have trouble accounting for consciousness and its subjective qualia. As the science develops and we discover facts, dualism does not seems likely to be true.
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
Describe what evolutionary psychologists mean when they employ the term ‘theory of mind’. Use examples and research studies from Book 1, Chapter 2 to show why this theory is important in evolutionary psychology.
Physicalism, or the idea that everything, including the mind, is physical is one of the major groups of theories about how the nature of the mind, alongside dualism and monism. This viewpoint strongly influences many ways in which we interact with our surrounding world, but it is not universally supported. Many objections have been raised to various aspects of the physicalist viewpoint with regards to the mind, due to apparent gaps in its explanatory power. One of these objections is Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument. This argument claims to show that even if one has all of the physical information about a situation, they can still lack knowledge about what it’s like to be in that situation. This is a problem for physicalism because physicalism claims that if a person knows everything physical about a situation they should know everything about a situation. There are, however, responses to the Knowledge Argument that patch up physicalism to where the Knowledge Argument no longer holds.
...r differences between particular humans and changes within one particular brain. One obvious example of this objection is that stroke victims lose brain function and the mental states associated with them, but in time they are able to relearn mental states using different parts of their brain. This certainly discounts the fact that one mental state is identical to one brain state.
Materialists claim that everything is either a physical thing or an aspect of a physical thing, and no physical thing is dependent on the mind. A physical thing is not necessarily a solid object, but...
In my experience, I am aware of many cases in which my body affects my mind (I stub my toe & I feel pain) and many cases in which my mind affects my body (I feel an itch & I scratch it).
Are minds physical things, or are they nonmaterial? If your beliefs and desires are caused by physical events outside of yourself, how can it be true that you act the way you do of your own free will? Are people genuinely moved by the welfare of others, or is all behavior, in reality, selfish? (Sober 203). These are questions relevant to philosophy of the mind and discussed through a variety of arguments. Two of the most important arguments with this discussion are Cartesian dualism and logical behaviorism, both of which argue the philosophy of the mind in two completely different ways. Robert Lane, a professor at the University of West Georgia, define the two as follows: Cartesian dualism is the theory that the mind and body are two totally different things, capable of existing separately, and logical behaviorism is the theory that our talk about beliefs, desires, and pains is not talk about ghostly or physical inner episodes, but instead about actual and potential patterns of behavior. Understanding of the two arguments is essential to interpret the decision making process; although dualism and behaviorism are prominent arguments for the philosophy of the mind, both have their strengths and weaknesses.
...ay need to be included in the answer to the mind-body problem in order for a true solution to be obtained. I do not believe that mental states can be explained with the simple firing of neurons. This explanation would leave out the conscious experience. Consciousness involves experience and an awareness of one?s surroundings. It seems as if this must be included in the answer to the mind-problem because if not, then this aspect would be left out. In order to correct Nader?s argument, one would need to clarify his presuppositions. However, he does seem to make plausible points and hopefully this will be enough to deter other philosophers from sticking straight to physicalism. Otherwise, they must first reject the subjective nature of the mind in order to come to a truly valid conclusion.
There are three types of behaviorism. The first, methodological is a normative theory about the scientific conduct of psychology. It claims that psychology should concern itself with the behavior of organisms and not with mental states or events or with constructing internal information processing accounts of behavior. ("Behaviorism," 2000) The second is psychological behaviorism. It explains human and animal behavior in terms of external physical stimuli, responses, learning histories and reinforcements. The last type is analytical or logical behaviorism. This theory has a philosophy about the meaning of mental terms and concepts. The idea of the mental state is the idea of behavioral tendencies that shows how a person behaves in one situation compared to another.
But, “human persons have an ‘inner’ dimension that is just as important as the ‘outer’ embodiment” (Cortez, 71). The “inner” element cannot be wholly explained by the “outer” embodiment, but it does give rise to inimitable facets of the human life, such as human dignity and personal identity. The mind-body problem entails two theories, dualism and physicalism. Dualism contends that distinct mental and physical realms exist, and they both must be taken into account. Its counterpart (weak) physicalism views the human as being completely bodily and physical, encompassing no non-physical, or spiritual, substances.
Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind (1949) is a critique of the notion that the mind is distinct from the body, and is a rejection of the philosophical theory that mental states are distinct from physical states. Ryle argues that the traditional approach to the relation of mind and body (i.e., the approach which is taken by the philosophy of Descartes) assumes that there is a basic distinction between Mind and Matter. According to Ryle, this assumption is a basic 'category-mistake,' because it attempts to analyze the relation betwen 'mind' and 'body' as if they were terms of the same logical category. Furthermore, Ryle argues that traditional Idealism makes a basic 'category-mistake' by trying to reduce physical reality to the same status as mental reality, and that Materialism makes a basic 'category-mistake' by trying to reduce mental reality to the same status as physical reality.