The decision to conduct the Sicilian Expedition is met with opposition from senior leadership and was not a good long-term strategic option for Athens. The vast differences between the strategic leadership styles of Nicias and Alcibiades, coupled with the allied support shortcomings, lend to the failure of this expedition and ultimately with Sparta defeating Athens in devastating fashion.
The Sicilian Expedition takes place between the period of 415 BC to 413 BC and the States of Athens and Sparta had been in a period of peace since 421 BC as a result of the Peace of Nicias treaty. Allies of Sparta and Athens indirectly bring them into this confrontation. Commanders Nicias and Alcibiades are in opposition from the beginning on whether or not to participate and the strategic direction of the expedition.
Nicias is in opposition from the start of a sea engagement that furthered the Athens’ interests and he made these opinions known in front of the entire assembly. He felt that Athens did not need to be “persuaded by foreigners into undertaking a war with which we have nothing to do.” (Strassler, p. 367, 6.9) In addition, Nicias outlines to the assembly the downfalls of fighting in distant lands (uncertainty of ally support for resources and the fact that cavalry resources will be detrimental to them) and the fact that
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In addition, Alcibiades fled to Sparta due to impending charges and became an advisor to Sparta on the ways to defeat Athens. The end result is that the majority of all the expeditionary forces from Athens are killed or captured and the Athenian democracy is overthrown in 411 BC. Most of the predictions made by Nicias for not engaging in war come to pass and he is killed in the
Thucydides accounts that the allies saw this as a great advantage – ‘Because of their dislike for Pausanias, [the allies] were glad to see her [Athens] do so’. Yet this seems terribly ironic considering the events that followed Athens’ promotion of leadership. Athens first task as leader was to assess the various forms of finance that were crucial to the league. It required a strong fleet of ships and strong funds in order to function.
In 480 and the years prior the Athenians and Spartans, banned together to defeat the Persian Army. The Spartans stand at Thermopylae, allowed the Athenians time to prepare, and ultimately allowed the victory. With both of these great city-states located so close together in Hellas, there differences would ultimately lead to dissension. Throughout the course of this paper, I hope to explain the reasoning behind the dissension between Sparta and Athens, made war between these former allies inevitable.
The stunning Greek defeat of the Persians, the specter of which lurks behind the events of the Peloponnesian Wars, was for Herodotus proof of the superiority of Hellenic form of government and way of life, and Herodotus ends his history at this pinnacle of Greek history. Thucydides then accepts the task of chronicling Greece’s unraveling from a position as the dominant power of the Mediterranean, and a center of cultural, technological, and political development to the final result of the Peloponnesian Wars—a fractured, demoralized, and dependent Greece that lies wide open to foreign conquest. This result is, for Thucydides, apparent from the beginning of the conflict. Greece can only dominate when the balance of power between Athens and Sparta is maintained, and the destruction of either is tantamount to the destruction of the whole. An accurate understanding of the national characters of Athens and Sparta makes it clear which of the two will ultimately be the victor of a long, arduous military struggle, but the same understanding of national character makes it equally apparent that the one which can dominate militarily cannot lead Greece. The speeches made at the First Lacedaemonian Congress emphasize not only the character of the two nations in conflict, but more broadly, the inevitability of Hellenic demise as a result of this conflict.
In section 110, the Melians threatened that if their allies the Lacedaemonians were provoked by the takeover of Melos, they might attack Athens itself: "...the Cretan sea is a large place; and the masters of the sea will have more difficulty in overtaking vessels which want to escape than the pursued in escaping. If the attempt should fail they may invade Attica itself, and find their way to allies of yours whom Brasidas did not reach: and then you will have to fight, not for the conquest of a land in which you have no concern, but nearer home, for the preservation of your confederacy and of your own territory. " In addition, the Melians complained that they would be thought of as cowards if they surrendered, and they warned the Athenians that hostility would turn other neutral city-states against them. The Melians offered mere speculation. Their arguments sound like the work of a weak and desperate g... ...
First of all, it is feasible to say that one of the most important reasons for the Athenian defeat was due to the fact that they were essentially not ready for another battle. The importance of prepraredness was exemplified by Percile's in his War speech, he was recollecting the Athenian ancestors success against the Persians and he stated it was "more good planning than good luck." The problem is that the Sicilian expedition was spontaneous and unanticipated, thus unplanned. As Thucydides recounts "that same winter, immediately after the destruction of Melos, Athens decided to attempt the conquest of the Greeks on Sicily."
Athens government and military is considerably different from their neighbors. According to Pericles, Athens government is not a copy of our neighbors...
Compare and contrast a prominent political and cultural element of the Athenian and Spartan poleis and how this was reflected by the Athenian Army at the Battle of Marathon in 490 BC and the 300 Spartan hoplites at the Battle of Thermopylae in 480 BC.
The book written by Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, contains two controversial debates between distinguished speakers of Athens. The two corresponding sides produce convincing arguments which can be taken as if produced as an honest opinion or out of self-interest. The two debates must be analyzed separately in order to conclude which one and which side was speaking out of honest opinion or self-interest, as well as which speakers are similar to each other in their approach to the situation.
The decision of Achilleus is a crucial moment in understanding how fate works in epic (Homerian) literature. Thetis tells Achilleus of his opportunity to win renown as the greatest warrior of all time, earning glory through his fearless acts in battle against a foe who is sure to overcome the Achaians. The fate of ten years of attack on Troy hinge upon the decision of Achilleus, who is given the choice to win glory for the Achaians and, more importantly, himself.
The causes of the Peloponnesian War proved to be too great between the tension-filled stubborn Greek city-states of Athens and Sparta. As Thucydides says in Karl Walling’s article, “Never had so many human beings been exiled, or so much human blood been shed” (4). The three phases of the war, which again, are the Archidamian war, the Sicilian Expedition and the Decelean war, show the events that followed the causes of the war, while also showing the forthcoming detrimental effects that eventually consumed both Athens and eventually Sparta effectively reshaping Greece.
Although the Spartans and Athenians fought for almost 20 years, there was a time when they lived in harmony. Almost 15 years before any disturbances the Athenians and Spartans fought together in the Persian war. During the Persian war, the Spartans were thriving in their fight against the Persians, however over time the Persians began to grow stronger. After being to lose their fighting streak, the Athenians came in to help the Spartans and bring an end to Persian dominance once and for all (The Delian League, 1). After defeating the Persians in 449 B.C., the...
...s of the war itself, there are a number of crucial points which set the course of the tide, and I have tried to illustrate those which I consider to be most important and influential. In any case, it seems that if Athens would have continued with the policy of Pericles, she might not have been so weakened by the destruction of her superior naval forces, which, it seems, can largely be accounted for by Alcibiades and his supporters.
The Lacedaemonians were not content with simply sending aid to Sicily; they also resolved to take the war to the Athenians. The Corinthians, the Spartans, and others in the Peloponnesian League sent more reinforcements to Syracuse, in the hopes of driving off the Athenians; but instead of withdrawing; the Athenians sent another hundred ships and another 5,000 troops to Sicily. Under Gylippus, the Syracusans and their allies were able to decisively defeat the Athenians on land; and Gylippus encouraged the Syracusans to build a navy, which was able to defeat the Athenian fleet when they attempted to withdraw. The Athenian army, attempting to withdraw overland to other, more friendly Sicilian cities, was divided and defeated; the entire Athenian fleet was destroyed, and virtually the entire Athenian army was sold off into slavery.
As can be expected from pioneer governmental institutions, Athenian democracy was not perfect. In fact it was far from it. It resulted in the establishment of poor policies by aggressive populists who sought "...private ambition and private profit...which were bad both for the Athenians themselves and their allies." (Thucydides). These self interested populist leaders with personal gain in mind established extensive internal political instability "...by quarrelling among themselves [and] began to bring confusion into the policy of the state." (Thucydides). Repeated opportunities to accept terms of peace after the battles of Pylos (425), Arginusae (406) and Aegospotami (405) were ignored by the inefficient Athenian demos eventually resulting in the devastation of the once dominant city-state. Internal political strife can also be attribu...
Sparta is the most formidable city known in history. Famous for her impressive military power, she proved that strength didn’t lie in numbers, it lay in Spartan discipline. Sparta started out as a small city fighting only to survive against enemy invaders. Her goal was to avoid defeat from other city-states and she very nearly succeeded in achieving it. Using self-denial, strong discipline and harsh training, Sparta focused almost all her attention on achieving her goal. Known as the ‘tamer of men’, her strength made all but Spartan men shrink in fear. However, Sparta did not wage war any more lightly then any other army, she simply waged it better. Despite the cold, military driven surface, Sparta often engaged in merriment. Festivals were celebrated with vigor, men were good to their families and their women were renowned for their beauty. Nevertheless, they always refused to become distracted from their purpose. Civil wars and ancient rivalries made it painfully clear that Sparta had no intention of allowing Athens or any other rival take over. However, she was still quite willing to join arms with the same rivals to fight off foreign invaders. When Greece was threatened by Persia, Sparta halted her competition with Athens and relentlessly fought back the enemy forces. After her triumph over the Persians, Sparta’s temporary peace with Athens was short-lived. The Greeks soon returned to their petty affairs. For 75 years Sparta and Athens fought for supremacy. Eventually, Sparta won, but in doing so she finally allowed all of Greece to witness her tragic flaw.