The Progression of Army Readiness Models into the 21st Century The Army has progressed through three different readiness models since the turn of the 21st Century. Force requirements drive changes to the system. In turn, force requirements have changed dramatically due to the Army’s involvement in the Global War on Terror. The method of change is one of evolution rather than revolution. Stressors on the force from global contingency operations serve to identify issues within readiness models. The readiness models then changed over time to meet the needs of the Army as a whole. Force Generation Models Three separate readiness models have served the army and its three components over the change from the 20th to 21st centuries; the Tiered …show more content…
The major change between the systems was the shift from a reset, train, ready model, to one of, prepare, ready, mission model (See Appendix). Under ARFORGEN, units would be unavailable for contingency operations after a deployment due to a decrease in readiness resulting from personnel turnover and training gaps. This downtime lead to the 1:1 BOG ratio during the surge. The Sustainable Readiness Model could fix this. Allowing units to be available during their first phase after a deployment increased overall readiness rates dramatically. The central concept behind the Sustainable Readiness model is the elimination of downtime post deployment (Chad R. Foster, 2016). With commanders required to maintain readiness for contingencies at all times, the percentage of available forces naturally increased. Associated costs rising is one of the notable detriments to Sustainable Readiness. The ARFORGEN model had peaks and valleys within its timeline, reducing costs during downtime. The Sustainable Readiness Model is more flat-line. Consistency in unit training is better. The responsibility to maintain readiness numbers is at the Brigade or Battalion level instead of the Corps or division level of previous models. Commanders at these levels typically have a better picture of the training requirements within their formations. While this …show more content…
The Sustainable Readiness Model will inevitably perform as advertised for the current fore structure with which the Army operates. The current environment is one of multiple conflicts separated by different countries generally in the Central Command area of operations. Say for instance that a near-peer enemy came into conflict with the United States of America. How would the current Readiness Model survive? There is no answer to say that the battle would even be long enough to require a replenishment of forces after the outset of conflict, possibly only lasting as long as the initial thermos-nuclear barrage on capital cities and force multipliers. Aside from the inevitability of nuclear war, a protracted battle with a near-peer is what may eventually push the Sustainable Readiness Model to change. More units are required for a head on head fight compared to the current requirement of our counterinsurgency force. The driving fact in modern readiness models is that change in the opponent creates a change in the readiness model. From opposing Russia in the Cold war, to combating the various factions in Afghanistan and Iraq, readiness has constantly evolved. It will continue to evolve according to whomever we oppose in the future. It may be possible through future planning and war-gaming to
Both systems are design to solve problems, but the type of problems and the process on how you arrive to the solution are the differences between them. The first contrast is that Army problem model is a systematic approach for solving well define problems. While some may argue that Rapid Decision-making and Synchronization Process (RDSP) is also a systematic process I argue that the process do not have an specific order and it depends on the commanders or staff mental ability to arrive with a single course of action in short time.
Unified Land Operations defines the army operational design methodology (ADM) as “a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them. The operational design methodology incorporated into army doctrine serves as a method to compliment the military decision making process (MDMP). Although the ADM it is often confused with replacing MDMP, its purpose is to address complex problems from a nonlinear approach. ADM helps the commander to answer questions to problems. However, only a collaborative effort of an operation planning team (OPT) will achieve the approach to answering complex problems. Doctrine alone does not provide the answer to complex problems, but rather offers a guide to solve them. To conceptualize the MDMP, planners must incorporate ADM to provide a better understanding, visualization, and description of the problem. The purpose of this paper is to provide the framework to support why ADM is required in the MDMP.
Joint Publication 3.0 entitled Joint Operations, defines Joint Sustainment as the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations through mission accomplishment and redeployment of the force. Joint Publication 4-0 further states, “Effective joint logistics planning identify future requirements and proposes solutions; it requires joint logisticians to understand the commander’s intent and concept of operations (CONOPS).” Logisticians use seven principles in their planning at the strategic, operational, or tactical level of war to ensure operations are logistically supportable. These principles are responsiveness, simplicity, flexibility, economy, attainability,...
Compare and Contrast the Army Problem Solving Model (Process) with the Rapid Decision making and Synchronization Process. (C100)
Shalikashvili, J.M. (n.d.). Shape, Respond, Prepare Now -- A Military Strategy for a New Era. National Military Strategy. Retrieved September 14, 2004, from http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/nms/index.html#Top
LM06, Strategic Planning Student Guide. (2013). Maxwell-Gunter AFB. Thomas N. Barnes Center for Enlisted Education (AETC).
O'Shea, Brandon J. "ARMY.MIL, The Official Homepage of the United States Army." "OPERATION POWER PACK. N.p., 20 Apr. 2010. Web. 27 Feb. 2014.
Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey opened the 2015 National Military Strategy with the line “complexity and rapid change characterize today’s strategic environment.” Robert Axelrod and Michael Cohen offer that complexity and rapid change describe a system that “consists of parts which interact in ways that heavily influence the probabilities of later events.” Further, human involvement in the strategic environment signifies that the “agents or populations” within the system will seek to change and these interactions and changes are extremely difficult if not impossible to predict. The integrated planning process combines detailed and conceptual planning to enable planning in a complex environment. The Army Design
Leaders today need to have an appreciation for the operation process, understand a situation, envision a desired future, and to lay out an approach that will achieve that future (Flynn & Schrankel, 2013). Plans need to be created that can be modified to changes in any factors considered. However, plans should not be dependent on specific information being precise or that require things to go exactly according to schedule. Instead, the staff NCO should be flexible where they can and always be prepared for the unexpected. Today’s military members are fighting an unconventional war in Iraq and Afghanistan. The enemy constantly changes their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP’s) to counter the United States technological advances, making planning very difficult for leaders. There are multiple tools at a staff NCO’s disposal to try to anticipate an outcome of a current operation, but also assist with the development of concepts in follow-on missions. The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is just one tool a staff NCO can utilize. In order to stay ahead of the enemy, create effective plans and orders, it is critical for a staff NCO to assist the commander, and understand that the MDMP and planning are essential in defeating the enemy and conserving the fighting force.
“Operational design is a journey of discovery, not a destination.” Operational design provides a framework, with the guidance of the Joint Force Commander (JFC), that staffs and planning groups can use to give political leaders, commanders, and warfighters a comprehensive understanding of the nature of the problems and objectives for which military forces will be committed, or are planned to be committed. Furthermore, operational design supports commanders and planners to make sense of complicated operational environments (often with ill-structured or wicked problems), helps to analyze wicked problem, and devise an operational approach to solve the problem in the context of the operational environment.
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
Compare and Contrast the Army Problem Solving Model (Process) with the Rapid Decision making and Synchronization Process. (C100)
Military leaders make decisions and solve problems every day. Some need a decision quickly while others can take time. The US Army has several decision-making methods to assist leaders. The Army Problem Solving Model (Process) (PSM) is a systematic approach to identifying the best possible solution to an issue or problem and a deliberate method of decision-making (FM 6-0, 2009). Leaders use it to solve a problem when time is not critical and they can put some thought into different solutions. The solution must be objective and based on facts in order for the decision to be relevant and practical. The Rapid Decision Making and Synchronization Process (RDM) is a decision-making and synchronization technique typically used during the execution phase of an operation (FM 5-0, 2010). Besides its use during execution, this style of decision making is quick and focuses on the ability to modify the plan, due to changing circumstances, and synchronize those changes with subordinate elements. Determining which method to apply requires an understanding of the similarities and differences of both techniques.
As we transition from subjective training to objective, it is critical to understand the emphasis on training has not changed, just the language. Commander will continue to focus on battle focus training developed by long- range, short- range and near- term planning. The Sustainable Readiness Model (SRM) is the Army’s newest system for prioritizing resources for units on a 5-year cycle based on the level of readiness they must achieve. Each year of the cycle has established Personnel (P), Sustain (S) and Readiness (R) Aim Points on the Unit Status Report (USR). The SRM seeks to stabilize units in a “band of excellence,” even following their READY year, maintaining the highest readiness level instead of automatically downgrading their readiness to a C4 level regardless of whether they deployed. Guidelines in the Prepare Year (PY) found in the SRM will assist Commanders at every level on key training events they will need to focus on for that particular