Arguments Given by David Chalmers for Rejecting a Materialistic Account of Consciousness in His Book
In this paper I will examine and criticize the arguments David Chalmers gives for rejecting a materialistic account of consciousness in his book The Conscious Mind. I will draw upon arguments and intuitions from the three main schools of thought in the philosophical study of consciousness(a) forms of dualism, (b) materialism, and (c) eliminativism. Chalmers' book deals with what are currently the most controversial issues in the study of consciousness, especially among these three schools of thought, so it provides a good guide to the important issues. This paper will concentrate on the debate between dualist and materialist theories of consciousness. I will draw on the views of Joseph Levine and discussions with Ken Taylor for materialist theories, on Chalmers' book for a dualist perspective, and I will use Dennett's writings for eliminativist considerations.
In his book, Chalmers argues that if one is to "take consciousness seriously," one should endorse a dualistic theory like his property dualism because materialism cannot explain how consciousness could amount to physical structures and processes. In the process, Chalmers argues against the eliminativist position which he claims does not "take consciousness seriously." I will begin by explaining the important concepts in the dualist-materialist-eliminativist debate such as consciousness; logical, metaphysical, and natural supervenience; and zombies. Next, I will explicate what I take to be Chalmers' main argument for property dualism. I will then explain where a materialist could object to Chalmers' argument, and how Chalmers tries to rule out such a response. Fi...
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...ary manner which does not perfectly correlate with our beliefs and desires, but which none the less allows beliefs and desires to fulfill the same causal roles in producing behavior. [BACK UP]
3. M. Davies and G. Humphreys, eds. Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993. [BACK UP]
4. Although it would be the case that had the first twin's hair color been different, the second twin's hair color would also have been different. [BACK UP]
Bibliography:
Dennett, Daniel. Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little Brown, 1991.
Chalmers, David. The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford UP, 1996.
Levine, Joseph. "On Leaving Out What It's Like." Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Eds. M. Davies and G. Humphreys. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.
Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell, 1972.
This paper will discuss the dualism’s Divisibility Argument. This argument relies on Leibniz’s Law and uses a different property to prove the distinctness of brain states of mental states. Mary, who is a materialist, presents several objections to that argument. Her main objection corresponds to the first/third-person approach. She believes that Dave presents that argument only from the first-person approach, which is introspection, and totally disregards the third-person approach, which is observation of another mind. Mary’s objections will follow by the Dave’s response on them from the dualist’s point of view.
In this theory, since it is based upon matter alone then this is a theory that does not correspond the best, in my opinion, with the essay. In the essay Daniel mentions many times where his mind, Dennett, feels like it is elsewhere from his brain and his body. He contemplates on whether or not Dennett resides in his brain that is out of his body in a life support vat or between his ears in his empty skull. He clearly distinguishes that his brain and body and mind are all separate from each other. In this materialism theory, I personally feel like this does not support Daniel Dennett in his understanding of this situation he was put
Chapter 4 discusses the several states of consciousness: the nature of consciousness, sleep and dreams, psychoactive drugs, hypnosis, and meditation. Consciousness is a crucial part of human experience, it represents that private inner mind where we think, feel, plan, wish, pray, omagine, and quietly relive experiences. William James described the mind as a stream of consciousness, a continuous flow of changing sensations, images thoughts, and feelings. Consciousness has two major parts: awareness and arousal. Awareness includes the awareness of the self and thoughts about one's experiences. Arousal is the physiological state of being engaged with the environment. Theory of mind refers to individuals understanding that they and others think,
The philosophical theory of dualism holds that mind and body are two separate entities. While dualism presupposes that the two ‘substances’ may interact, it contrasts physicalism by refusing to denote correlation between body and mind as proof of identity. Comparing the two theories, dualism’s invulnerable proof of the existence of qualia manages to evade arguments from physicalism. While a common argument against qualia—non-physical properties defined in Jackson’s Knowledge Argument—targets the unsound nature of epiphenomenalism, this claim is not fatal to the theory of dualism as it contains claims of causation and fails to stand resolute to the conceivability of philosophical zombies. This essay argues that epiphenomenalism, while often designated as a weakness when present in an argument, can remain in valid arguments from qualia.
Underlying each of these claims is the theme of the unification of body and mind into a state of consciousness which greatly facilitates clarity and order in one's awareness. Through the deep periods of rest achieved during levels of transcendental consciousness, t...
Rosenthal D 2002, 'Explaining Consciousness', in Philosophy of mind classical and contemporary readings,Chalmers D J (eds), Oxford University press, New York
Fodor begins his article on the mind-body problem with a review of the current theories of dualism and materialism. According to dualism, the mind and body are two separate entities with the body being physical and the mind being nonphysical. If this is the case, though, then there can be no interaction between the two. The mind could not influence anything physical without violating the laws of physics. The materialist theory, on the other hand, states that the mind is not distinct from the physical. In fact, supporters of the materialist theory believe that behavior does not have mental causes. When the materialist theory is split into logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory, the foundation of functionalism begins to form. Logical behaviorism states that every mental feeling has the same meaning as an if-then statement. For example, instead of saying "Dr. Lux is hungry," one would say "If there was a quart of macadamia brittle nut in the freezer, Dr. Lux would eat it." The central-state identity theory states that a certain mental state equals a certain neurophysiological state. The theory works in a way similar to Berkeley’s representation of objects. Both mental states and objects are a certain collection of perceptions that together identify the particular state or object.
Renner, T., Feldman, R., Majors, M., Morrissey, J., & Mae, L. (2011). States of Consciousness. Psychsmart (pp. 99-107). New York: McGraw-Hill.
The desire to avoid dualism has been the driving motive behind much contemporary work on the mind-body problem. Gilbert Ryle made fun of it as the theory of 'the ghost in the machine', and various forms of behaviorism and materialism are designed to show that a place can be found for thoughts, sensations, feelings, and other mental phenomena in a purely physical world. But these theories have trouble accounting for consciousness and its subjective qualia. As the science develops and we discover facts, dualism does not seems likely to be true.
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
Physicalism, or the idea that everything, including the mind, is physical is one of the major groups of theories about how the nature of the mind, alongside dualism and monism. This viewpoint strongly influences many ways in which we interact with our surrounding world, but it is not universally supported. Many objections have been raised to various aspects of the physicalist viewpoint with regards to the mind, due to apparent gaps in its explanatory power. One of these objections is Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument. This argument claims to show that even if one has all of the physical information about a situation, they can still lack knowledge about what it’s like to be in that situation. This is a problem for physicalism because physicalism claims that if a person knows everything physical about a situation they should know everything about a situation. There are, however, responses to the Knowledge Argument that patch up physicalism to where the Knowledge Argument no longer holds.
Davis, Tom. The Theories of the Mind Lectures. Ed. G. Baston. Birmingham University. 9 Nov. 2000
Two of the most fundamental parts within the Cartesian dualism argument are both the conceivability argument, and also the divisibility argument. Both arguments aim to show that the mind (thinking things) and body (extensions) are separate substances, both of which arguments can be found within Meditation VI. Within this essay, I shall introduce both arguments, and critically assess the credibility of both, discovering whether they can be seen as sound arguments, or flawed due to incorrect premises or logical fallacies.
D. W. Hamlyn - author. Publisher: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Place of Publication: Sensation and Perception: A History of the Philosophy of Perception. Contributors: London. Publication Year: 1961. Page Number: iii.
“Consciousness is defined as everything of which we are aware at any given time - our thoughts, feelings, sensations, and perceptions of the external environment. Physiological researchers have returned to the study of consciousness, in examining physiological rhythms, sleep, and altered states of consciousness (changes in awareness produced by sleep, meditation, hypnosis, and drugs)” (Wood, 2011, 169). There are five levels of consciousness; Conscious (sensing, perceiving, and choosing), Preconscious (memories that we can access), Unconscious ( memories that we can not access), Non-conscious ( bodily functions without sensation), and Subconscious ( “inner child,” self image formed in early childhood).