Antitakeover Amendment Proposal

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This master thesis investigate the influence of board monitoring on the market’s response to corporate antitakeover amendment proposals in particular to classified boards. Board monitoring is measured using board composition, board ownership structure, and leadership structure. The stock price reaction to antitakeover amendment proposals of classified boards is negatively related to the portion of inside and affiliated outside directors on the board. Moreover, for companies in which the CEO also is the chairman of the board, the response turn out to be more negative since inside and affiliated outside directors on the board increase their stake on the firm and their proportional number on the board makes them more entrench to the firm. On the …show more content…

Paul in his 2007 paper also indicates the similar argument with McWilliams and Sen (1998). In her paper, she investigates the role of corporate boards following large declines in share value surrounding acquisition announcements. She concludes that firms with independent boards are less likely to complete the value-decreasing bids, suggesting that boards influence corporate responses to information in stock prices. Board independence is also associated with unusually high frequencies of asset restructuring for bids that are completed, suggesting that independent boards promote restructuring in mergers the market believes are difficult to integrate (Paul, 2007). Another paper that supports the independent board argument is from Kolasinski and Li (2013). They provided evidence that strong and independent boards help overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) avoid honest mistakes when they seek to acquire other …show more content…

Faleye (2007) argue that classified boards (which is one of the form of antitakeover amendments) destroy value by entrenching management and reducing director effectiveness. He concludes that classified boards significantly insulate management from market discipline, thus suggesting that the reduction in value is due to managerial entrenchment and diminished board accountability. However on the contrary, the paper from Thomas W. Bates, David A. Becher, and Michael L. Lemmon (2008) stated that although board classification does indeed reduce the likelihood of receiving a takeover bid, the economic effect of bid deterrence on the value of the firm is quite small which leads them to conclude that the evidence from their resulted research is inconsistent with the conventional wisdom that board classification is an antitakeover device that facilitates managerial entrenchment (Bates, Becher, and Lemmon,

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