The Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943 was a success.1 Codenamed Operation HUSKY, it was the largest amphibious operation of World War II.2 Although successful, if further evaluated by today’s modern joint doctrine, Operation HUSKY accentuates the breakdown and weakness of the Allies’ operational integration of the six current joint functions, and its costly affects that likely prolonged the war. Lessons learned from Operation HUSKY accentuate the importance of all six modern joint functions. However, breakdown in command and control by Allied leadership and its’ mission command tenant are two notable functions. This breakdown in command and control further obstructed Allied mission command attributes: commander’s intent, mutual trust, …show more content…
His lack of aggressiveness, control of his subordinate commanders, and the failed staff work of Force 141 contributed to the poor planning of Operation HUSKY.11 Additionally, British General Alexander, second in command, unsuccessfully provided critical intent and competent direction in lieu of General Eisenhower’s shortfalls. General Alexander’s distraction with Tunisia only compounded senior leader intent. This lack of intent allowed General Patton, Seventh U.S. Army commander, and General Montgomery the Eighth British Army commander to subjectively plan and execute uncoordinated attacks along partisan lines. This contributed to a lack of Allied integration of attacks leading to the withdrawal of over 100,000 men and 10,000 vehicles North to Italy by the Axis forces further exacerbating mutual trust among the …show more content…
forces stemming from Operation Torch and placing General Patton in a supporting role in Operation HUSKY.15 Despite General Patton’s success in the west of Sicily, General Alexander hesitated to trust the Americans with this task and for the remainder of Operation HUSKY his decision would be influenced by this mistrust.16 The lack of mutual trust between the Allies provides current JFC and joint staffs an insight to the effects of mistrust and the potential cost of human capital. The Allies mistrust exhibited in Operation HUSKY greatly contributed to the breakdown of the third mission command attribute, shared
Mission command is the commander's use of authority and direction to empower adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. It helps subordinates exercise disciplined initiative when operating within their commander’s intent. To facilitate effective mission command, commanders must accomplish four consecutive stages of the operations process. They must thoroughly understand the problem, visualize a solution that achieves a desired end state, and then accurately describe this visualization in order to direct the organization. Commanders continually lead and assess their organizations and provide input and influence to their subordinates and staff.
COL Prescott’s role in the Battle of Bunker Hill, or more correctly know as the Battle of Breed’s Hill, is a great example of how to properly execute mission command. An overview from The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour (Moncure) reveals a number of operation and strategic objectives that the American militia had to consider. In this instance, COL Prescott takes charge of 1200 men with instructions to defend against incoming British forces that were seeking to occupy the surrounding hills during the Siege of Boston campaign. COL Prescott utilized a variety of steps in the operations process that contributed to his expert utilization of mission command over his forces. Through various sources from published works by experts on the subject, COL Prescott’s mission command demonstrates its effectiveness in his understanding of the situation against the British, his visualization to create an end state for t...
The mission command philosophy helps commanders counter the uncertainty of operations by reducing the amount of certainty needed to act. Commanders can build teams and achieve their final goals through adapting the six principles of mission command to warfighting situation. I analyzed and compared the performance of General Sherman and General Hampton in four of six mission command principles.
In order to receive a victory in the Battle of the Bulge, General Patton used Mission Command Analysis in order to understand how he can be successful for this mission. The first thing of understanding t...
At the same time, the SOF units were diligently working with the Northern Alliance and local fighters to gain trust and also train them for future battles.... ... middle of paper ... ... 2 Colonel John T. Carney Jr., No Room for Error, 277.
Amid the snow-covered hills in the tiny village of Chipyong-Ni, Korea, a battle ridden 23rd Regimental Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division made a decisive stand from February 13-15, 1951 that would lead to the first operational win against a much stronger and larger force. In what some considered being the Gettysburg of the Korean War, the Battle of Chipyong-Ni was a bitterly contested engagement between the X Corp, 23rd Regimental Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, under the command of COL. Paul Freeman the North Korean People’s Army and the Chinese Communist Forces’ (CCF). This analysis will demonstrate that COL Paul Freemans’ ability to properly use mission command ultimately led to the first operational defeat of the enemy since the Korean War had started.
By the summer of 1943 the Allied Powers had finished their campaigns in North Africa. Their next objective was to move into Sicily and invade Italy to cause the Germans to move northwest from the coast. This came to be known as “Operation Husky which was designed to open the shipping lanes in the Mediterranean, eliminate it as an Axis base, and to aid in the fall of Mussolini’s government” (Hickman n.d.). In July 8th, 1943 Mowat, now an intelligence officer was ordered to head to Sicily to participate in Operation Husky. They left the night of the 8th and encountered terribly rough seas due to the sirocco. The sirocco is an intense wind that comes off of the Sahara. It looked as though Operation Husky would be cancelled. Fortunately, later that night the wind slowed and the platoons were able to continue with the operation. The invasion commenced on the night of July 9th, landing on the west side of the Pachi...
In late November 2001 Task Force 58 launched from ships off the coast of Pakistan to conduct the longest ranged amphibious assault in history with 403 Marines and Sailors, 4 fast-attack vehicles, and a variety of supporting equipment,. General James N. Mattis successfully accomplished this in large part to the effective execution of mission command. Commanders can utilize mission command as a philosophy or a warfighting function. Mission command as a philosophy is the use of commander's intent and mission orders to empower agile and adaptive leaders. It enables commanders to counter the uncertainty of operations by reducing the amount of certainty required to act in a given situation. Commanders build cohesive teams, provide a clear commander's intent and guidance, encourage the use of disciplined initiative, and use mission orders through the operations process to effectively use mission command as a philosophy. Commanders drive this operations process using mission command through six steps. First, they must understand the operational environment and the problem. Second, a commander must visualize his desired end state and operational approach. Third, he must describe that visualization to subordinates using time, space, purpose, and resources. Fourth, commanders must direct forces throughout preparation and execution. Finally, through each of the first four steps, commanders need to lead through purpose and motivation and assess through continuous monitoring and evaluation. General Mattis successfully utilized mission command as a philosophy by understanding, visualizing, leading, describing, and assessing through the operations process as the commander of Naval Task Force 58.
The commander’s intent is a critical part of mission command. The commander, through the commander’s intent, must blend the art of command and the science of control that integrates all joint warfighting functions. ADM Wesley McDonald, Commander US Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), failed to convey the commander’s intent to the joint force for Operation Urgent Fury. This failure promoted misunderstanding and mutual trust issues among the joint force that affected the integration of joint functions such as intelligence and sustainment.
It began to emerge the differences in tactics. The question was whether to continue so far the Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Forces Europe, General Eisenhower’s tactics attacking on a broad front, or due to problems of supply to take just one mighty blow. In that period Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery developed a new operation plan, which would include the use of 1st Airborne Army (Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton), actually 1st Airborne Corps (Lieutenant General Frederick Browning). The Corps comprised of 82nd US Airborne Division (Brigadier General James M. Gavin), 101st US Airborne Division (Major General Maxwell D. Taylor), and 1st British Airborne Division (Major General Robert “Roy” E. Urquhart) supported with, under his command, 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade (Major General Stanislaw Sosabowski). These units should be dropped along the roa...
Successful leadership on a battlefield can be measured in different ways. It is possible for a good, successful leader to lose a battle. Conversely, it is possible for an ineffective leader to win a battle, given the right circumstances. What distinguishes a successful leader from an unsuccessful one is his/her ability to oversee an operation using effective mission command. In ADP 6-0, mission command as a philosophy is defined as “as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations” (ADP, 1). William Henry Harrison, Governor of the Indiana Territory, executed good mission command in the Battle of Tippecanoe because of his ability to effectively utilize the doctrinal tasks of “understand, visualize, describe, direct, and lead” operations.
A defined chain of command with equal representation from all the armed services coupled with standardized clear communication and training throughout the branches, results in an elite fighting force with endless capabilities. Efficiency is the major goal behind Joint Warfare and so long as the clear channels of communication throughout the services hold true, this goal is attainable. This efficiency, though almost impossible to fully achieve, was seen during Desert Storm. During the Desert Storm campaign, General Schwarztkopf was Commander and Chief of US Central Command (USCINCCENT). His first order of business was to name component commanders.
Gen. Heinrich Freiherr von Lüttwitz′s, commanding the XLVII Panzer Corps under the directive of Hasso von Manteuffel, commander of the 5th Panzer Army; was given the responsibility of capturing the town of Bastogne. On the morning of the 16th of December the German offensive opened up, attacking American positions on Elsenborn Ridge and Losheim Gap in an attempt to break through to the town of Liège. By the 19th the Americans had issued resistance to German forces yet were fighting an uphill battle through undesirable weather and were low on ammunition, fuel and rations. Due to these conditions General Bruce Clarke held out in the town of St. Vith until the untimely collapse of that post which led to the encirclement of the 101st Airborne and the 10th Armored Division's Combat Command B at Bastogne.
The most effective commanders through their leadership build cohesive teams. Mutual trust, shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk serve as just a few principles for mission command. Mutual trust is the foundation of any successful professional relationship that a commander shares with his staff and subordinates. The shared understanding of an operational environment functions, as the basis for the commander to effectively accomplish the mission. While my advice for the commander on what prudent risks to take may create more opportunities rather than accepting defeat. Incorporating the principles of mission command by building cohesive teams through mutual trust, fostering an environment of shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk will make me an effective adviser to the commander, aid the staff during the operations process, and provide an example for Soldiers to emulate.
There was also confusion over unity of command. Admiral McDonald, commander of LANTCOM, made two errors in command and control. He did not assign one his subordinate commanders to act as the overall director of ground forces no matter what the service and he did not select the commander of XVIII Airborne Corps as the leader of Army forces. The lack of a single commander meant that coordination between the Marines and the Army was minimal. The lack of a designated ground force commander and the omission of XVIII airborne Corps muddied the commander’s intent. The services would have been ...