In this essay I will be explaining Hilary Putnam 's "Brains in Vats" theory, as well as giving my own personal opinion if Putnam has solved the theory. Hilary Putman, who taught Philosophy at Harvard University (page 397, Brains in Vats), wrote an argument to clear if we are really BIV 's (Brains in vats). He starts off his argument by clearing up what a "causal connection" is. If an ant were to accidentally outline the picture of Winston Churchill, very many people would not claim that the ant purposely referred to Churchill. Putnam states that "nothing physical has intentionality" (page 398, paragraph 1, "Brains in Vats", Hilary Putnam). Putnam goes on to say that he wants us to imagine what that we are brains in vats hooked up to a …show more content…
Even though Putnam shows that a brain in a vat would refer to different things then an embodied brain, there are still some points that I think proves that we could be brains in a vat and not even know it. In Putnam 's theory we have two different perspectives. The perspective of the evil scientist outside of the vat, and the envatted brains perspective inside the vat. If the evil scientist says "that’s a tree", that statement is true to the evil scientist. If the scientist relays this information to the envatted brain through the computer and the envatted brain says "that’s a tree", the statement would be false. The envatted brain is referring to a simulation of a tree and not the actual tree the scientist was referring too. The envatted brain only can refer to virtual objects in its own "vat language" but cannot refer to real objects like the evil scientist …show more content…
Suppose the envatted brain is controlled by an automatic machine tending to the vats. If we look at this we see two different objects here- the brain and the automatic machine-and both get their information internally. From the perspective of the machine, if the machine says "that’s a tree" its statement would be true to the machine because there are no external connections or references (evil scientist) to say otherwise or compare too. From the envatted brains perspective, if the machine was to relay the information to the brain stating "that’s a tree", and the envatted brain then says "that’s a tree" the statement would also be true. The machines version of a tree would be true to the machine and its relaying that information to the envatted brain which then would refer to a tree. They are both referring to a simulation of a tree, which would be a "true" reference because that would be the only tree both the machine and the envatted brain knows. You could not say the envatted brain was not referring to objects "truly" if the envatted brain was in fact referring rightfully to its external machine. So in a virtual "brains in a vat world", an envatted brain and the machine it was hooked up to and running off of, would only know how to refer to anything as virtual (But it would be real to both of them). If we did live in a world of only envatted brains that referred
In Carol Dweck’s article titled, “Brainology” Dweck discusses the different mindsets that students have about intelligence. Some where taught that each person had a set amount of intelligence, while others were trained that intelligence is something they could develop and increase over time. in Dweck’s article she writes, “ It is a belief that intelligence can be developed that opens students to a love of learning, a belief in the power of effort and constrictive, determined reactions to setbacks” (Dweck pg. 2). Dweck is talking about a growth mind-set in which is how students perceive the growth of knowledge and that no one person is born with a certain amount of intelligence, it too can be trained and developed over time. By introducing Dweck’s ideas of a growth mind-set to students, students will enjoy learning and be less devastated by setbacks, because they know they can develop intelligence. Dweck also writes that students with a growth mind-set, “believe that intelligence is something that can be cultivated through effort and education. They
I find, however, that Clark’s conclusion is false, and that the following considerations provide a convincing argument for the premises leading to this conclusion, starting with premise one: “the brain is constructed like a computer, since both contain parts which enable them to function.” This statement is plausible, yet questionable. Yes, the mind contains tissue, veins, and nerves etc. which enable it to function, the same way that a computer contains wires, chips, and gigabytes etc. which it needs to function. However, can it be possible to compare the two when humans devised these parts and the computer itself so that it can function? If both “machines”, as Clark believes, were constructed by the same being this comparison might be more credible. Clark might argue that humans were made just as computers were made so therefore it could be appropriate to categorize them together. I feel that this response would fail because it is uncertain where exactly humans were made and how, unless one relies on faith, whereas computers are constructed by humans in warehouses or factories.
The general point behind the homunculi-head introduces consideration to the possibility of brain functions being done by parts which could not together be conscious. Functionalism requires only similar machine instructions which serve out a set of outputs given a set of inputs. Block’s counter arguments shows such an account of
Smart argues from the stance of identity theorist and believes that mental sensations are identical to a corresponding brain-process. Much of Smart’s paper is a counter argument against an identity theorist’s greatest rival, the dualist. Most of the human body has been explained by science in terms of biology, chemistry, and physics; though the brain remains largely mysterious. Recent technological advances regarding the research of the brain has allowed us to understand the mind in much better ways which is why Smart feels “that science is increasingly giving us a viewpoint whereby organisms are able to be seen as physicochemical mechanism” (61). He introduces the concept of Ockham’s razor and feels that scientists use it to introduce simplicity into their theories, which makes their explanations of concepts simpler. This simplicity is preferred because it also adds a sense of beauty to the laws discovered. With regards to his lightning example, Smart highlights how our experience of lightning is the physical process of discharged electrons from the ionization of water vapor in the atmosphere. Important to note here is that the two cannot be separated; you will not have a flash of lightning and then an electric discharge, rather lightning is electric discharge. This metaphor is crucial essay’s argument that sensations are identical to brain-processes. Ockham’s razor eliminates unnecessary nomological danglers from scientific theories, so why not apply the same concept to a theory of mind? We wouldn’t describe in our theory of lightning the ‘flashiness’ or ‘jaggedne...
In the chapter “Attention Deficit: The Brain Syndrome of Our Era,” from The New Brain, written by Richard Restak, Restak makes some very good points on his view of multitasking and modern technology. He argues that multitasking is very inefficient and that our modern technology is making our minds weaker. Multitasking and modern technology is causing people to care too much what other people think of them, to not be able to focus on one topic, and to not be able to think for themselves.
Criticism #2: Some people believe that the eight intelligence does not necessary distinct, it would be a subset of a general intelligence a.k.a “g” that was originally proposed by Charles Spearman in 1927 although the existence of ‘g’ itself is the subject of
inaugurates the humans perplexing systems and how they alter the way one thinks such as with logic
...whether the simulation of mental processes resulting from a computer program are real mental processes?
...re, innovation to speculation, the human brain is a jumble of nerves and tissue like no other. It has not only brought humans to the front of the world stage in comparison to all others, it has given us the ability to do so much more than think it gave us the ability to be human.
In The article “Brainology” “Carol S Dweck, a professor of psychology at Stanford University, differentiates between having a fixed and growth mindset in addition how these mindsets have a deep effect on a student’s desire to learn. Individuals who have a fixed mindset believe they are smart without putting in effort and are afraid of obstacles, lack motivation, and their focus is to appear smart.. In contrast, students with a growth mindset learn by facing obstacles and are motivated to learn. Dwecks argues that students should develop a growth mindset.
Freedom is a concept that is held in high regard and cherished amongst a lot of people. The idea of “freedom” is to make choices based on your own decision with no external influences. But are you making the decision for yourself? The possibility that machines will be able to simulate the human brain is all over the news now a days. President Barrack Obama’s Brain Initiative program dedicates 100 million dollars to fund research for “how we think”. And in Europe the Blue Brain Project is attempting to recreate the human brain in all its minute details thusly engineering an artificial mind. The idea behind the Blue Brain Project is that if brains sustain thought then if we can deconstruct a brain and then put it back together inside a computer we could engineer and artificial intelligence with a conscience.
If a machine passes the test, then it is clear that for many ordinary people it would be a sufficient reason to say that that is a thinking machine. And, in fact, since it is able to conversate with a human and to actually fool him and convince him that the machine is human, this would seem t...
In Carol Dweck’s “Brainology” the article explains how our brain is always being altered by our experiences and knowledge during our lifespan. For this Dweck conducted a research in what students believe about their own brain and their thoughts in their intelligence. They were questioned, if intelligence was something fixed or if it could grow and change; and how this affected their motivation, learning, and academic achievements. The response to it came with different points of views, beliefs, or mindset in which created different behavior and learning tendencies. These two mindsets are call fixed and growth mindsets. In a fixed mindset, the individual believes that intelligence is something already obtain and that is it. They worry if they
Hilary Putnam. The thesis states that different physical properties may implement the same mental property. This argument has evolved since Putnam’s original goal of rejecting type-identity theory and many philosophers have redefined the implications of multiple realizability. There are two philosophers in philosophy of mind that are famous for their work in exploring multiple realizability and the implications this thesis has on science, or more specifically psychology. Jaegwon Kim and Jerry Fodor both take a stab at multiple realizability, but neither will come to the same conclusion.
The traditional notion that seeks to compare human minds, with all its intricacies and biochemical functions, to that of artificially programmed digital computers, is self-defeating and it should be discredited in dialogs regarding the theory of artificial intelligence. This traditional notion is akin to comparing, in crude terms, cars and aeroplanes or ice cream and cream cheese. Human mental states are caused by various behaviours of elements in the brain, and these behaviours in are adjudged by the biochemical composition of our brains, which are responsible for our thoughts and functions. When we discuss mental states of systems it is important to distinguish between human brains and that of any natural or artificial organisms which is said to have central processing systems (i.e. brains of chimpanzees, microchips etc.). Although various similarities may exist between those systems in terms of functions and behaviourism, the intrinsic intentionality within those systems differ extensively. Although it may not be possible to prove that whether or not mental states exist at all in systems other than our own, in this paper I will strive to present arguments that a machine that computes and responds to inputs does indeed have a state of mind, but one that does not necessarily result in a form of mentality. This paper will discuss how the states and intentionality of digital computers are different from the states of human brains and yet they are indeed states of a mind resulting from various functions in their central processing systems.