Limitations An airborne force like the 82nd Airborne Division does have its limitations. An airborne planner or commander must recognize the limitations. Each leader should plan accordingly to adjust the planning concept and make the necessary changes. The Airforce is a key player in the Army airborne mission. The weather, type of aircraft dictates the airborne unit mission range and scope of time of the operation. Some policy-makers think that the airborne operation is obsolete due to technology. “Retired Col. Doug Macgregor has materialized as a vocal Army critic since retiring from the Army in 2004. The former 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry commander, holds a Ph.D. in international relations and calls large-scale airborne operations outdated
As the incoming brigade commander, LTC (P) Owens, I see the critical leadership problem facing the 4th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) is the inability or unwillingness of Colonel Cutler to lead and manage change effectively. In initial talks with Col Cutler and in reviewing the brigade’s historical unit status reports, the 4th ABCT performed as well as can be expected in Afghanistan, but as the onion was peeled back there are numerous organizational issues that were brought to the surface while I walked around and listened to the soldiers of the 4th ABCT, in addition to reviewing the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) report. One of the most formidable tasks of a leader is to improve the organization while simultaneously accomplishing
The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is a network of select aircraft from several commercial airlines that are all committed in various amounts to the Department of Defense (DoD) to provide airlift resources when the capability of U.S. military aircraft is exceeded. This system is designed so that these carriers can provide military cargo movement and troop transportation to anywhere in the world on short notice in the event of a military conflict. In order for airlines to join the CRAF, they must commit at least 30 percent of their long-range passenger fleet and 15 percent of their long-range cargo planes (Fact Sheet, 2004). These aircraft must also be U.S. registered, capable of over water operations, and have at least four complete crews assigned for each aircraft (Fact Sheet, 2004). Airlines that participate in CRAF have provided vital support to our military since the Korean War (Graham, David, 2003). The Persian Gulf War was the first official activation of the CRAF, where two thirds of the troops and one quarter of the air cargo was moved by commercial airplanes (Graham, 2003). Though not officially activated, the CRAF is currently supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom, providing nearly double the amount of aircraft that the DoD has estimated for its most demanding war strategies. This paper will provide a brief explanation of the purpose of the CRAF, its history, the effectiveness of the program, and a quick look towards the future of the CRAF.
Air Defense Artillery remains one of the most respected assets to the United States Army, ready to deploy its units and weapon systems at anytime and anywhere in support of freedom. Works Cited Brigade General Scales, Robert H. JR. Certain Victory. The U.S. Army in the Gulf War. NewYork: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993.
In all US wars throughout history, the US Army Infantryman has played a crucial role in the success or failure of every battle. Typically, in any major battle when a country has stood toe to toe with the Army Infantryman, they have failed. The 173rd Airborne Brigade during the Vietnam War was no exception. The 173rd Infantryman accounted for more kills on the battlefield in Operation Hump than any other US asset.1 In this paper, we’ll review the 173rd Airborne Brigades mission, objectives, situation and outcome of their success in Operation Hump.
...f it.” (Sharp, 1993) Truer words have never been spoken. As Senior Noncommissioned Officers in the United States Air Force, we need to follow suit and act in the same manner.
Operational leaders appreciate that SC is a critical element to achieving victory in current and future conflicts, but continue to struggle with how to employ SC given the lack of doctrine. A view across the combatant commands illustrates that “many different approaches to SC are being utilized, with uneven results. Processes are often quite different and integration into the planning process is not consistent.” Operational planners recognize SC is a necessary element of planning but are unsure how to plan for it.
World War II was one of the deadliest military conflicts in history. There were many different battles that took place within this war; some more important than others. World War II began once Germany’s new dictator, Adolf Hitler, decided that he wanted to gain power for Germany and for himself. One of Hitler’s first moves in power was invading Poland on September 1, 1939. Many other countries became involved in this war because of the alliance system. The two sides during this war were the Allies and Axis powers. German, Italy and Japan were on the Axis powers; France, Britain, and the United States were on the Allies. Germany first began with the Blitzkrieg tactic meaning “lightning war”. This tactic is based on speed, surprise and was the most popular tactic. It is set up with military forces based around tanks which are supported by planes and infantry. The Blitzkrieg tactic lead to air wars with airplanes between countries. All of the countries were allowed to participate in the air wars but the four main countries were United States, Japan, Britain, and Germany. During the 1920’s and 1930’s airplanes grew in size and structure giving them more power, and making planes more effective. Planes made it easier to drop bombs, or plan attacks. All of these countries fought over air superiority. Air superiority is the position in which the air force has control over all of the air warfare and air power of the opposing forces. Germany began with air superiority but they lost it when Britain defeated them at the Battle of Britain. Gaining control over the air is a very big advantage because it is easier to plan an attack on an opposing country. All of the countries relied on their aircrafts during this war. The issue about the use of...
The ability to understand a problem, determine the desired end state, and develop a strategy to achieve that end state is a highly sought after skill in every facet of the military profession. However, in a joint setting, the problems are generally much more complex requiring an advanced mastery of problem solving from joint staff officers. The complexities of planning on the joint staff level stem from the amount of education it takes to simply understand the problem. Joint staff officers not only must understand the components and capabilities of their own service, they must also understand any service they might interact with to include the nine combatant commands. These demands put a heavy emphasis on joint professional military education before the joint staff officer shows up to their assignm...
It began to emerge the differences in tactics. The question was whether to continue so far the Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Forces Europe, General Eisenhower’s tactics attacking on a broad front, or due to problems of supply to take just one mighty blow. In that period Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery developed a new operation plan, which would include the use of 1st Airborne Army (Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton), actually 1st Airborne Corps (Lieutenant General Frederick Browning). The Corps comprised of 82nd US Airborne Division (Brigadier General James M. Gavin), 101st US Airborne Division (Major General Maxwell D. Taylor), and 1st British Airborne Division (Major General Robert “Roy” E. Urquhart) supported with, under his command, 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade (Major General Stanislaw Sosabowski). These units should be dropped along the roa...
All you need to know about the role physics plays in the flight of an aircraft.
I was at Fort Benning Georgia in August 1988 to attend jump school. I had done my basic training here four years earlier with Sgt. Smith who would be my black hat true instructor for airborne school. I was standing in formation at five in the morning. It was cold now, but Georgia has hot, humid daytime temperatures that were draining mentally and physically for a student from Northern California. I knew I wanted to be here even though there would be physical and mental stresses, challenges and the possibility of serious Injury. The students would be weeded out at every point. I did not want it to happen to me. During my four years in the Army, I learned that I like to be an independent, resourceful, goal oriented problem solver. In the infantry, I had to obey the orders and not think for myself. Uniformity in everything was demanded.
Leaders today need to have an appreciation for the operation process, understand a situation, envision a desired future, and to lay out an approach that will achieve that future (Flynn & Schrankel, 2013). Plans need to be created that can be modified to changes in any factors considered. However, plans should not be dependent on specific information being precise or that require things to go exactly according to schedule. Instead, the staff NCO should be flexible where they can and always be prepared for the unexpected. Today’s military members are fighting an unconventional war in Iraq and Afghanistan. The enemy constantly changes their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP’s) to counter the United States technological advances, making planning very difficult for leaders. There are multiple tools at a staff NCO’s disposal to try to anticipate an outcome of a current operation, but also assist with the development of concepts in follow-on missions. The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is just one tool a staff NCO can utilize. In order to stay ahead of the enemy, create effective plans and orders, it is critical for a staff NCO to assist the commander, and understand that the MDMP and planning are essential in defeating the enemy and conserving the fighting force.
The United States Army has been through many changes since its start in 1775, yet it remains the greatest, most disciplined all volunteer fighting force in the world. Like the service members of the past and present, many Army units have contributed to the success of our military, and like those service members many have been lost. Even though these units are not as well known as the divisions they have belonged to, they have enriched the history of our Army just the same. The achievements of the 123rd Aviation Battalion have contributed to the history and success of our nations battles.
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
In today’s operational environments, the U.S. Army is facing a range of problems and mission sets that are arguably more complex than previously encountered. Forces face an array of demands that encompass geo-political, social, cultural, and military factors that interact in unpredictable ways. The inherent complexity of today’s operations has underscored the need for the Army to expand beyond its traditional approach to operational planning. In March 2010 in FM 5-0: The Operations