Clausewitz's On War, first published in 1832, until now remains one of the most influential studies in understanding character, nature and conditions of warfare. In his book Clausewitz not only traced an interaction of intension and planning with the realities of combat, but by exploring the relationship of war to policy, politics and society gave a new philosophical justification to the art of war. (Heuser, 2002)
One of the most important claims made by Clausewitz in his book is that “war is a continuation of politics by other means”. (Clausewitz, 2007, p. 28) Indeed, Clausewitz argues that despite its violent character war is predetermined by political objectives and dictated by the rational pursuit of political goals. As he puts it in his book: “The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose”. (Clausewitz, 2007, p. 29)
By the end of the Cold War the literature focusing on strategic studies has highlighted transformational changes within international system that affected and altered the very nature of war. As a result many security studies scholars have renounced traditional theories of strategic thought. Clausewitzian theory, in particular, has taken a lot of criticism, regarding its relevance to modern warfare. (Gray, How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?, 2005)
In this essay I argue that despite transformational changes in the character of war the nature of war has remained unchanged and therefore Clausewitzian concept on relationship between “war” and “politics” remain a viable tool that contributes to our understanding of contemporary warfare. First, I will evaluate Clausewitz’ trinity concept, then present the arguments of...
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...f war. It’ll probably be utopian to claim that all of Clausewitz's military thoughts have remained relevant. His vision of war did not include its economic, air, sea, and space dimensions, for example. But his concept of war, his trinity, and his understanding of the relationship between politics and war “will remain valid as long as states, drug lords, warrior clans, and terrorist groups have mind to wage it”. (Echevarria, 1996) I would agree that it is not that Clausewitz provides the best theory of war that ever could be, but only that it is the best available. (Gray, Clausewitz, History, and the Future Strategic World, 2003) Therefore as long as communities wage war in order to preserve their identities as well as pursue their interests, Clausewitz’s theory will remain a useful tool for understanding and analyzing war and violent conflict. (Herberg-Rothe, 2009)
Von Clausewitz, Carl. Translated and edited by Sir Michael Howard and Peter Paret. On War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
Tighe, Joseph A. 2004. "All Quiet on the Western Front: A Phenomenological Investigation of War." Critical Survey 16, no. 3(Fall 2004): 48-61.
Throughout history there have been few military theorists who have influenced military thinking. The military revolution that occurred during the American Civil War changed the face of warfare. The theories of both Antione-Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz, the two most prominent military theorists of the 19th Century, can be seen in many aspects of the conflict. While Jomini’s tactics played a large role on the battlefield, the strategic concepts of Carl Von Clausewitz best characterize the nature of the Civil War. The writings of Clausewitz proved prophetic in three distinct areas: the strength of the defense over the offense, the concept of “Total War” used by General Grant, and the theory of war as an extension of policy.
Moseley, Alexander. "Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy." Just War Theory. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 10 Feb. 2009. Web. 31 Mar. 2012. .
McDonald. “Just War Theory.” Humanities. Boston University. College of General Studies, Boston. 24 February 2014. Lecture.
“The art of war is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of life and death, a road to either safety or ruin. Hence it is the subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected” by Sun Tzu by of Sun Tzu’s philosophy on warfare in 400-320 B.C. echoes back across time, when the ancient world was being shaped and carved by war.
War is a universal phenomenon, it is a violent tool people use to accomplish their interests. It is not autonomous, rather policy always determines its character. Normally it starts when diplomacy fails to reach a peaceful end. War is not an end rather than a mean to reach the end, however, it does not end, and it only rests in preparation for better conditions. It is a simple and dynamic act with difficult and unstable factors which make it unpredictable and complex. It is a resistant environment where the simplest act is difficult to perform. In this paper, I will argue why war is a universal phenomenon and what are the implications of my argument to strategists.
It is interesting and even surprising that the two major strategies regarding war were developed by European contemporaries of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century. Antoine Henri de Jomini (1779-1869) approached his philosophy of war in a structured, scientific manner. Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) took a more fluid, open-ended approach to his philosophy of war. The fact that they lived during the same time period in Europe is also fascinating in that they likely knew of each others’ writings as well as potentially influenced and were influenced by the philosophy of the other. Jomini’s scientific approach is more applicable to the tactical and operational levels of war while Clausewitz approaches war as more of an art or interaction between people that is more appropriate to the strategic and political levels of war. Although their two war strategies are presented as opposing strategies, by comparing concepts from each of the theorists to the other theorist’s work shows that they are actually more complementary than competing in that they are addressing different levels of war. The concepts to be evaluated are Clausewitz’s “Trinity of War”, “war as a continuation of politics”, and the “unpredictability of war” as well as Jomini’s definition of strategy and his “Fundamental Principle of War”.
War is the means to many ends. The ends of ruthless dictators, of land disputes, and lives – each play its part in the reasoning for war. War is controllable. It can be avoided; however, once it begins, the bat...
Much confusion has arisen from misinterpretation of Clausewitz’s discussions on Schwerpunkt or “center of gravity”. Many students of military theory interpret Clausewitz’s ideas through their own historical perspectives. For example, military officers tend to confuse military objectives for centers of gravity, assuming physical objects such as ships or cities are the source of a countries power. While these objects may provide tactical advantages, true power arises from the critical strengths possessed by a country, be they political, diplomatic, military, or informational. The Argentinean military junta made similar mistakes during their invasion of the Falklands. Without fully understanding the source of British power in the region, the Argentineans attacked military objectives, while missing British centers of gravity. Because they failed to analyze the critical factors and capabilities of both the enemy and themselves, they were doomed to failure from the outset of the mission.
Relations between countries are similar to interpersonal relations. When the conflicts between countries escalates to some extent, any resolutions become unrealistic except violence, and wars then occur. Although wars already include death and pain, moralists suggest that there should still be some moral restrictions on them, including the target toward whom the attack in a war should be performed, and the manner in which it is to be done. A philosopher named Thomas Nagel presents his opinion and develops his argument on such topic in the article “War and Massacre”. In this essay, I will describe and explain his main argument, try to propose my own objection to it, and then discuss how he would respond to my objection.
War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning, written by the talented author Chris Hedges, gives us provoking thoughts that are somewhat painful to read but at the same time are quite personal confessions. Chris Hedges, a talented journalist to say the least, brings nearly 15 years of being a foreign correspondent to this book and subjectively concludes how all of his world experiences tie together. Throughout his book, he unifies themes present in all wars he experienced first hand. The most important themes I was able to draw from this book were, war skews reality, dominates culture, seduces society with its heroic attributes, distorts memory, and supports a cause, and allures us by a constant battle between death and love.
Amongst military theorists and practitioners who studied war, its origin and implications, Carl von Clausewitz assumes a place among the most prominent figures. With his book On War, he demonstrated his capability to provide thorough historical analysis and conclusions of the conflicts in which he was engaged, and as a philosopher he reflected about all encompassing aspects of war. Today, Western armies conduct modern warfare in a dynamic environment composed of flexible and multiple threats in which civilians form a substantial part. Studying Clausewitz provides current military and political leadership useful insights to understand twenty-first century warfare. He explains the nature of war, provides an analytical tool to understand the chaos of warfare, and he argues for well educated and adaptable leadership capable of creative thinking. Although he died before his work was complete, his writing style was ambiguous and unclear at some moments, and current technology reduced some of his tactics obsolete, his work still arouses and inspires military and political strategists and analysts.
If we look at the history of the world with a kaleidoscope, we can see the different aspects of war and what effect it had on the mind of different people and artists such as poets, painters and authors. Many poets romanticized war, luring it with their pen and giving it a beautiful look by glorifying death and obliging young blood to fight for their motherland. For example the poems “Peace” by Rupert Brooke and “Fall In” by Harold Begbie painted war with the highlights of glamorous and sensation. Apart from poets there are also politicians who achieved their aims with the help of war and violence while others who used the weapons of non violence to achieve their goals. The most famous example is of Adolf Hitler who took the aid of war to conquer the territories. The media also has a great impact on the mind of the public, like newspapers, televisions, radios arouses the public’s interest and motivates the young generation to join the army and fight for the nation. However, there are artists who look at war in its very naked form. For example the poet Wilfred Owen in his poem “Dulce Et Decorum Est” demonstrates that no sweetness or honor is earned in dying for one’s country, instead humanity is taken away during war.
As modern military historians debate on the founder of military strategy, two military theorists emerge in the period after the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic War: the Prussian Carl von Clausewitz and the Swiss Antoine-Henri Jomini. In modern military philosophy, the theoretical traditions established by each of these military theorist has significantly impacted our military thinking and their teaching has become essential in the education of modern military leaders. Clausewitz and Jomini have become required reading for today's military professional officer. Frequently, these military theorists are often presented as opposite each other in terms of military theory; however, these two individuals are mere contemporaries who approached the study of war from two separate positions and for different ambitions: one an attempt at a comprehensive analysis of war and the other a reduction of war to a set of prescriptive techniques for the conduct of war. In this great debate, military historians suggest a schism within the annals of military theory in the use of the terms “Clausewitzian” and “Jominian.” While these unfair characterizations served little purpose in this debate, this essay will demonstrate that Carl von Clausewitz deserves the title of Father of Modern Military Strategy.