Much confusion has arisen from misinterpretation of Clausewitz’s discussions on Schwerpunkt or “center of gravity”. Many students of military theory interpret Clausewitz’s ideas through their own historical perspectives. For example, military officers tend to confuse military objectives for centers of gravity, assuming physical objects such as ships or cities are the source of a countries power. While these objects may provide tactical advantages, true power arises from the critical strengths possessed by a country, be they political, diplomatic, military, or informational. The Argentinean military junta made similar mistakes during their invasion of the Falklands. Without fully understanding the source of British power in the region, the Argentineans attacked military objectives, while missing British centers of gravity. Because they failed to analyze the critical factors and capabilities of both the enemy and themselves, they were doomed to failure from the outset of the mission. Vego defines the center of gravity as the “source of massed strength—physical or moral—or a source of leverage whose serious degradation, dislocation, neutralization, or destruction would have the most decisive impact on the enemy’s or one’s own ability to accomplish a given military objective.” (Vego, 2007). On the strategic level, a nation’s strength arises from its political, military, economic, and informational power. Nations use these powers against opponents to achieve political goals. Successful campaigns leverage a nation’s strengths against enemy’s weaknesses. By the fall of 1981, the Argentinean government under the leadership of General Galtieri and the military junta was experiencing a significant decrease of power. Economical... ... middle of paper ... ... M. (2000). The Vatican Mediation if the Beagle Channel Dispute: Crisis Intervention and Forum Building. In C. C. Conflict, M. C. Greenberg, J. H. Barton, & M. E. McGuinness (Eds.), Words Over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict (pp. 293-320). New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Laver, R. C. (2001). The Falklands/Malvinas Case: Breaking the Deadlock in the Anglo-Argentine Sovereignty Dispute. Developments in International Law , 40, 66-71. Rock, D. (1987). Argentina, 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alphonsín. Berkley: University of California Press. Scheina, R. L. (1987). Latin America: A Naval History 1810–1987. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. Vego, M. (2007). Joint Operational Warfare. Newport, RI: Naval War College. William, M. D. (2005). War Policy, Public Support, and the Media. Parameters , 121-134.
Wilson, T. W. (n.d.). "Fourteen Points" Avalon Project - Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy. Retrieved April 14, 2011, from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp
Immediately after Argentina’s military regime was over the newly reinstated democratic government kept its neoliberal economic system and was praised for doing so. Many organizations claimed that Argentina would be the country that would lead other Latin American countries into the future through its use of neoliberal pol...
The War of the Triple Alliance is regarded as the bloodiest war in the history of Latin America, taking place from 1864 to 1870. In a seemingly uneven match up, the country of Paraguay took on an alliance of three countries: Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina. Paraguay started this conflict under the rule of Francisco Solano López, the country’s dictator. What would make Fransisco Solano López, dictator of Paraguay, exponentially increase his military forces and attack an alliance of three countries, two of which are much larger than Paraguay? I will use operational code to study the dictator who started the war and examine reasons as to why he made such the rash and risky decision that he did. After examining Francisco Solano López’s operational code, I will delve into the topic of prospect theory to further evaluate the reasons for mobilizing a military and starting a war, and the risks involved with doing so. The topic of militarized interstate disputes, otherwise known as MIDs, will be the last subject I discuss in relation to the causes of the war, and I will explain his motives for the dispute as well as the motives of the opposition
One of the most important factors in a nation’s success in war is strategy, and it is also the
The economy of Latin American countries such as Argentina have often focused on only one main product at a time and imported many of the other products needed. Argentina especially followed this economic strategy in the late 1800’s. Latin American countries focus on one product it does well and does not stray from that product. The countries were just following trends and taking advantage of what the market dictates is a worthwhile product. This strategy can fall short of having long-term success and lead to a land of poverty. This was the case in most every country in Latin America, and all the economy revolved around the growth of industry in each country. Technology, increased immigration, European influence, and political policy all influenced the economic state of Latin American countries and led to economic struggles.
In his article Advice for a Dictator, German politician Joseph Goebbels wrote, “A dictatorship requires three things: a man, an idea, and a following ready to live for the man and the idea, and if necessary to die for them” (Goebbels). Here Goebbels states the bare minimum required for a dictatorship to rule a country, but for a dictatorship to run a country, it must have unity; dictators require a unified body of people to have power over, and a unified staff of advisors to help maintain that power (13). From 1976 to 1983, the Argentine Republic was ruled by a dictatorship formally known as the National Reorganization Process. The National Reorganization Process lacked unity, and thus, was a flawed dictatorship. In 1955 the National Reorganization Process led a military coup on Peron, the former president of Argentina. The coup succeeded and as a result, the National Reorganization Process was the governing body of Argentina, and the dictatorship was in full control of its people. However, soon after the coup, Argentina returned to a state of corruption due to a division of the population into left-wing guerrillas and right-wing militants (4, p. 366). This split of the population reduced the power of the dictatorship, and subsequently caused the Dirty War, a seven year internal conflict (5, p. 4-5). Following the split and the dictatorial loss of power, changes were made in the administration of the National Reorganization Process. The dictatorship of Argentina was run mostly independently...
In a recent verbal bout with my History of the Military Art professor, I contended that the true might of a nation may be inversely proportional to the size of its military during peacetime. My thinking, though perhaps idealistic, was that the maintenance of a large military during relative international tranquility is an overt admission of weakness and increases the likelihood of unnecessarily employing that force—it is contextually irrelevant. Instead, I proposed that a strong and stable economy is the best metric of national prowess, for such an economy can resource many opportunities as they arise. On the contrary, a robust standing military has a much narrower utility. To be sure, this author is not one that intentionally seeks to take an interdisciplinary approach to academia, but the connection seems relevant given the nature of this assignment. Whereas a nation may accomplish a strategic goal through military force, a leader may accomplish a task relying upon coercive power; whereas a nation may transform and develop the world through its economic strength and versatility, a versatile leader may transform others through the employment of one or many leader development principles—both theoretically based and experientially acquired. This piece serves to describe acquired PL499 course concepts and their relevance to my project team and the West Point Leader Development System (WPLDS). Only through a...
preventing the war. This was a two-day event in New York, the first day the
Maxwell, Hilary. “Warfare Plans of Countries.” Monta Vista High School, Cupertino. 26 Jan. 2014. Lecture.
War is the means to many ends. The ends of ruthless dictators, of land disputes, and lives – each play its part in the reasoning for war. War is controllable. It can be avoided; however, once it begins, the bat...
Origins for the cooperation amongst powers necessary to tackle international disputes can be traced back to the 19th century, however the formation of the League of Nations was eagerly prompted by the First World War. After the horrors in which the world observed, leaders merged together and rejoiced in the potential for a new international system. The League of Nations foremost objective was to secure peace through collective efforts of ‘peace-loving’ powers (Steans, Pettiford, & Diez, 2005, p. 31). President Woodrow Wilson was a lead proponent in the creation of such a body, suggesting it- within his message on the Conditions of Peace- as a means of ‘affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike’ (Wilson, 1918). The following year a detailed scheme was presented at the Versailles Peace Conference and the league was swiftly established with the addition of a permanent secretariat in Geneva. (Catterall, 1999, p. 50). The League was very much considered the ‘most daring and innovative proposal’ (Wilkinson, 2007, p. 85)
By the end of the Cold War the literature focusing on strategic studies has highlighted transformational changes within international system that affected and altered the very nature of war. As a result many security studies scholars have renounced traditional theories of strategic thought. Clausewitzian theory, in particular, has taken a lot of criticism, regarding its relevance to modern warfare. (Gray, How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?, 2005)
Ott, Marvin C. "Mediation as a Method of Conflict Resolution: Two Cases." International Organization 26.04 (1972): 595-618. JSTOR. Web. 3 Dec. 2013.
The 1982 Falklands/Malvinas dispute between Great Britain and Argentina was inevitable because the two nations had such different views and priorities on land sovereignty. Britain’s constant postponements and withdrawals on conceding Argentina sovereignty over the land strengthened Argentinian feelings of nationalism and undermined any and all intentions of peaceful negotiations. The only plausible way that Argentina could have been convinced to withdraw before war broke out would have been during the initial stages of conflict. The only convincing tactic against Argentina would have been using force, but “a costly defence commitment to some remote imperial outpost” was the last thing either party wanted (37).
Amongst military theorists and practitioners who studied war, its origin and implications, Carl von Clausewitz assumes a place among the most prominent figures. With his book On War, he demonstrated his capability to provide thorough historical analysis and conclusions of the conflicts in which he was engaged, and as a philosopher he reflected about all encompassing aspects of war. Today, Western armies conduct modern warfare in a dynamic environment composed of flexible and multiple threats in which civilians form a substantial part. Studying Clausewitz provides current military and political leadership useful insights to understand twenty-first century warfare. He explains the nature of war, provides an analytical tool to understand the chaos of warfare, and he argues for well educated and adaptable leadership capable of creative thinking. Although he died before his work was complete, his writing style was ambiguous and unclear at some moments, and current technology reduced some of his tactics obsolete, his work still arouses and inspires military and political strategists and analysts.