The Battalion S2 (BN S2) section deployed is defined as a battalion intelligence staff. Operations include ground forces visually conducting operations in a infantry battalion at Baghdad, Iraq. Irregular warfare provides a defining amount of visualization on the enemy threat. The tactical level of intelligence will exist on BN S2 battle rhythm, lethal targeting process, system applications and usage, and intelligence assets. This definition shares in a tradition for dominating target development. The BN S2 intelligence superiority is defined by a specific targeting structure for developing the enemy threat.
The BN S2 battle rhythm process is a technical sequence for parallel staff planning. BN S2 intelligence superiority is established by continuous reporting of the battle rhythm. The working groups are reported by platoon leaders, Assistant Battalion S2 (BN AS2), BN S2, Brigade Assistant S2 (BCT AS2), and Fires and Effects Coordination Cell (FECC). The connections are made to working groups for brigade targeting of 4 x BN S2/AS2, BCT AS2, and FECC. Working groups continue on one weekly meeting for target development. Continuous working groups provide targeting structure importance. Thereafter intelligence products connect to continue planning. The connections are made to working groups for battalion targeting of Company Intelligence Support Team Officer (COIST) and BN S2. Working groups continue on three weekly meetings for target development. Those areas of reporting will be marked by current intelligence reports. Robert Clark writes,
Because all participants share knowledge of the target, they are better able to identify gaps in knowledge and understand the important issues surrounding the target. Th...
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...urveillance areas. Maximizing effectiveness of signal intelligences while executing patrols. The areas will be synchronized to battalion assets. Patrols are made by all possible assets during employment. The intelligence assets are to include information for the targeting development.
The BN S2 section deployed provides emphasis as directing intelligence information. Operations include ground forces sharing in a tradition of dominating enemy threats. Intelligence superiority is therefore established by a specific targeting process. The Iraq war provides a visualization of conducting the targeting processes. Intelligence value is made evident by completing a continuous targeting process of working groups. Connecting to intelligence superiority at all levels of command. The tactical level of intelligence thereafter seeks to define target development.
Teamwork harnesses individual accomplishments toward organizational objectives and is the key to spreading my 4th ABCT vision. Leaders and Soldiers alike, create synergy and a positive organizational environment by sharing in each other’s accomplishments and foster a culture of interest, instead of indifference. My intent is for 4th ABCT to develop an understanding of this team mentality, realizing how as individuals we are limited to the sum of our efforts and achievements, while as a team our efforts and achievements are multiplied. Pride, performance, and camaraderie in our organization will increase motivation because each individual achievement is shared by all. I will look to CSM Ivor, my brigade staff, and “battalion command teams” (Battalion Commanders and CSMs) to share and embody my vision of teamwork and foster the same within their commands. They will be my guiding coalition and lead agents for change, and I expect them to build our team through coaching, teaching, and mentoring their subordinates. This exemplifies engaged leadership and shares my vision because leaders are investing time in training and counseling our soldiers, and empowers our subordinates to execute it. I think that once we start acting like a team again pride in the unit will surge as leaders demonstrate engaged leadership with increased counseling and active mentorship programs. Members of the unit will spend more time together, strengthening professional and personal bonds and incorporating families at after hour unit evens. Our success will ultimately be realized when I MAJ Cobb more at church on Sundays than on my appointment
In order to receive a victory in the Battle of the Bulge, General Patton used Mission Command Analysis in order to understand how he can be successful for this mission. The first thing of understanding t...
I have organized this paper into five distinct sections; mission, task organization, capabilities, limitations, and finally the conclusion. After the reading and comprehension of this paper, you should have gained a basic understanding of the Special Forces (SF) Chemical Reconnaissance Detachments (CRD). The following paper is mixed with Unclassified (UCI) and For Official Use Only (FOUO) information. FOUO is annotated at the beginning of all For Official Use Only information, the rest of the paper is UCI. If you wish to share this information paper with others, please at a minimum; confirm identity of the person prior to providing (FM 380-5, 2000). For further handling instructions please refer to FM 380-5, or contact me, I will gladly answer all questions.
...e. Logistically the Chinese were unprepared to support a force the size of the 9Th PVA and lost a number of soldiers to the bitter cold weather due to them being ill-equipped. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is a crucial step in the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and is vital to mission success. Had the proper importance been placed on analyzing the Chinese threat, the outcome of the Korean War might have been different.
The Technical Escort Unit (TEU) now provides the Department of Defense and other federal agencies to include the Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation with an immediate response capability for chemical and biological warfare material. Its mission is to provide a global response for escorting, packaging, detection, rendering-safe, disposing, sampling, analytics, and remediation missions. This does not only include chemical weapons for which it was originally created, but now incorporates biological weapons, state sponsored laboratories, small independent laboratories and small non-weaponized radioactive materials. Most recently, they have been task organized to assist Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) as a force multiplier; the objective of this is to give the Battle Field Commander instant on the ground intelligence regarding Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) hazards within their Area of Operations (AO). With this new mission with the BCT, the TEU is becoming an expeditionary force.
...al technical intelligence requirements (United States, I).” As wars continue, we must remain open to apply new strategies and tactics that will keep us out front as one of the most strategically and tactically sound military forces.
A big challenge faced by those planning the operation, was that no one had the full picture. The command and control of units in Afghanistan were split into three separate entities; each had their own assets and intelligence sources. The U.S. ground forces under United States Central Command (CENTCOM) were lead by Lieutenant General (LG) Paul Mikolashek out of Kuwait. How...
...these intelligence failures, more emphasis is now placed on the creation of intelligence products used on the battlefield. All possible enemy courses of actions are now red teamed in an attempt to produce a much accurate analytical product.
The complexities inherent to Command and Control (C2) of a large homogeneous armed force can be overwhelming even to the most experienced. Adding other countries’ leadership, experience, requirements, training and tactics to a combined and multi-lateral endeavor adds even more complexity to unity of command and control, not to mention all other functional requirements. This essay will evaluate the deficiencies associated with the joint functions during Operation Husky using the three attributes of mission command from joint doctrine: commander’s intent, understanding, and mutual trust. It will also evaluate two additional joint functions, intelligence and movement and maneuver, for an Allied force that was created to deliver an Axis defeat
... Like the relationship of situational understanding and situational awareness, operational art is at a higher stratum than operational design. The commander must visualize the operation from start to finish with elements of creativity and innovation. For the operations-level commander, this is the premise for them to reach their determination of intent. Yet at some point, intangibles and the unquantifiable have to enter into a system of process. This is the goal of operational design. In simplest terms, operational art may draw commander’s attention to the forces of PMESH-II to aid in the identification of the operational environment; operational design will draw the commander’s attention to his or her combat capability and time constraints while contextually and adaptively improving MDMP or Joint Operational Planning process efficiencies and effectiveness.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, Joint Publication 2-01 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 January 2012).pg II-6
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Battle of Kamdesh and provide an alternate outcome based on the utilization of intelligence and intelligence assets. Many battles could have had a different outcome if they would trust intelligence reports without needing to validate the intelligence with another source or simply have other intelligence assets available. The Battle of Kamdesh was certainly one of those battles. The battle started just before 0600 on October 3, 2009 on Combat Outpost (COP) Keating and nearby Observation Post (OP) Fritsche in the Kamdesh district of Nuristan Province, Afghanistan. About 70 Soldiers of Bravo Troop, 3rd Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment, along with 30 Afghan National Army Soldiers (ANA), fought an enemy force of about 300 Anti-Afghan Forces (AAF) fighters. (Nordland, 2010) The battle took place in the Consolidation II portion of the Operation Enduring Freedom Campaign in Afghanistan. The AAF likely
Headquarters, Department of the Army (29 August 2007), FM 3-11.20 Technical Escort Battalion Operations, pgs 1-1 thru 2-14
The ability to understand a problem, determine the desired end state, and develop a strategy to achieve that end state is a highly sought after skill in every facet of the military profession. However, in a joint setting, the problems are generally much more complex requiring an advanced mastery of problem solving from joint staff officers. The complexities of planning on the joint staff level stem from the amount of education it takes to simply understand the problem. Joint staff officers not only must understand the components and capabilities of their own service, they must also understand any service they might interact with to include the nine combatant commands. These demands put a heavy emphasis on joint professional military education before the joint staff officer shows up to their assignm...
There are many agencies that have the ability to perform Signals Intelligence, electronic reconnaissance and most of all signals intelligence from all available sources inducive to the environment. The United States Army uses the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) as its main entity for signals collection. The Joint STARS platform was designed to provide a highly effective, real-time, collection tool to the ground task force commanders during battlefield engagements, but for the past ten years, the sensor has been used for peacekeeping missions. Army analysts can predict the enemy’s behavior by identifying choke points, potential avenues of approach and operating patterns such as supply routes and logistical points. The analysis gives the ground commander a more complete view of the enemy’s weaknesses. The United States Air Force employs the Joint STARS in a different mission than the Army. The Air Force uses Joint STARS as a battlefield management tool versus a collection tool as used for by the Army. The Air Force uses the platform to provide immediate and direct support to the Air Component Commander and continue to observe the enemy’s movement from a far distance in the sky. Providing essential data to commanders such as size, direction, and speed of the adversaries, with minimum casualties while under battlefield conditions, makes the Joint STARS an extremely effective tool. The Air Force also employs the Predator vehicles, which are unmanned aerial vehicles that are used for reconnaissance.