The Battalion S2 (BN S2) section deployed is defined as a battalion intelligence staff. Operations include ground forces visually conducting operations in a infantry battalion at Baghdad, Iraq. Irregular warfare provides a defining amount of visualization on the enemy threat. The tactical level of intelligence will exist on BN S2 battle rhythm, lethal targeting process, system applications and usage, and intelligence assets. This definition shares in a tradition for dominating target development. The BN S2 intelligence superiority is defined by a specific targeting structure for developing the enemy threat. The BN S2 battle rhythm process is a technical sequence for parallel staff planning. BN S2 intelligence superiority is established by continuous reporting of the battle rhythm. The working groups are reported by platoon leaders, Assistant Battalion S2 (BN AS2), BN S2, Brigade Assistant S2 (BCT AS2), and Fires and Effects Coordination Cell (FECC). The connections are made to working groups for brigade targeting of 4 x BN S2/AS2, BCT AS2, and FECC. Working groups continue on one weekly meeting for target development. Continuous working groups provide targeting structure importance. Thereafter intelligence products connect to continue planning. The connections are made to working groups for battalion targeting of Company Intelligence Support Team Officer (COIST) and BN S2. Working groups continue on three weekly meetings for target development. Those areas of reporting will be marked by current intelligence reports. Robert Clark writes, Because all participants share knowledge of the target, they are better able to identify gaps in knowledge and understand the important issues surrounding the target. Th... ... middle of paper ... ...urveillance areas. Maximizing effectiveness of signal intelligences while executing patrols. The areas will be synchronized to battalion assets. Patrols are made by all possible assets during employment. The intelligence assets are to include information for the targeting development. The BN S2 section deployed provides emphasis as directing intelligence information. Operations include ground forces sharing in a tradition of dominating enemy threats. Intelligence superiority is therefore established by a specific targeting process. The Iraq war provides a visualization of conducting the targeting processes. Intelligence value is made evident by completing a continuous targeting process of working groups. Connecting to intelligence superiority at all levels of command. The tactical level of intelligence thereafter seeks to define target development.
Mission command is the commander's use of authority and direction to empower adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. It helps subordinates exercise disciplined initiative when operating within their commander’s intent. To facilitate effective mission command, commanders must accomplish four consecutive stages of the operations process. They must thoroughly understand the problem, visualize a solution that achieves a desired end state, and then accurately describe this visualization in order to direct the organization. Commanders continually lead and assess their organizations and provide input and influence to their subordinates and staff.
(U) Background: Over the course of United States history the Army has made changes to how it engages its foreign enemies. These tactics techniques and procedures are the result of lessons learned during conflict, mistakes made under fire, and the results of a nation at war. As a result the IPB process has changed to accommodate a dynamic and often fluid battlefield. However this has not changed the core concept behind IPB, the four steps still remain an integral part of the Commanders Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), and are essential in war gaming. IPB assist in providing valuable Intelligence to the War Fighter throughout all phases of operations. This paper will cover each step of the IPB Process as well as discuss products associated with each of those steps and how these products can be an asset to the Commander and the War Fighter.
In order to receive a victory in the Battle of the Bulge, General Patton used Mission Command Analysis in order to understand how he can be successful for this mission. The first thing of understanding t...
Linda Robinson’s One Hundred Victories: Special Ops and the Future of American Warfare is a study of the changing role of America’s Special Forces. It shows how the role of Special Forces has changed during the war in Afghanistan. The book is a meticulous look at the difficulties faced by special operation forces in their effort to implement the strategy of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Additionally, it covers the general strategy of Village Stability Operations. Moreover, she explored what exactly Special Forces were and how they operated in Afghanistan. Finally, the author makes her prediction on the future role of Special Forces.
In this paper, I will provide a Battle Analysis and outline the events leading up to and surrounding the Battle of 73 Eastings (refers to a north-south grid line). In addition, I will describe how the United States Army’s (USA) 2nd Armored Calvary Regiment (ACR) defeated forces from the Iraqi Republican Guard (IRG) using speed, technology and superior combat power. Although some consider the Battle of 73 Eastings extremely successful, some consider it a failure due to the large amount of Iraqi forces that retreated towards Bagdad. Lastly, I will analyze how each side used their intelligence assets and what they could have used to change the outcome.
2. Battle Management, Command, Control, and Communications (BM/C3): The BM/C3 component is divided into two main parts. First, the Command and Control (BM/C2) system controls the overall NMD system. Information from sensors is forwarded to the BM/C2, which processes the data and determines the targets for the GBI to intercept. Second, the In-Flight Interceptor Communications System (IFICS) is a network of ground systems that relay communications to the GBI while in flight to guide it to the incoming warhead.
The 2nd Brigade of 101st Airborne Division found out in the summer of 2004 that they had to prepare for the war in the Middle East more particularly for Iraq. With Colonel Todd Ebel in Command of the 2nd Division with a year to prepare over 3,400 men and woman he got right to work. Colonel Ebel started by choosing his staff and who he thought was fit to take charge and lead this ever more complicated war. It was a huge religious civil war taking place in Iraq at the time with the Sunnis at war against the Shi’ite and after the capture of Saddam insurgency started uprising immediately. This uprising along with the uprising of Muqtada al-Sadr a key leader that had lots of violent followers that soon grew into a form of a militia called Mahdi Army which became another huge problem for the U.S. because the line between a legitamite populist movement and a huge theocratic organized-crime and terror ring was a thin one. The 2nd Brigade Infantry Battalions consisted of 1-502nd (First Strike) and 2-502nd (Strike Force) and 2nd brigade as a whole is known as the “Black Hearts”. Ebel’s mission was to deny insurgent’s access to Baghdad through his AO and as intelligence increased to uproot and destroy insurgent safe havens, while also training the IA so they could ensure the stability of the region later on. Ebel chose Lt. Col. Kunk as commander of “First Strike” 1-502nd and Lt. Col. Haycock as commander of “Strike Force” 2-502nd. By Ebel’s personality evaluations of Kunk and Haycock he decided that Kunk would work in the area that involved him being more engaging where populist centers were and work with local officials and Haycock more in the fighting areas. Kunk was in command of 3 rifle companies, 1 weapons company, 1 logistics company...
Shalikashvili, J.M. (n.d.). Shape, Respond, Prepare Now -- A Military Strategy for a New Era. National Military Strategy. Retrieved September 14, 2004, from http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/nms/index.html#Top
Intelligence failure was one of the main reasons why the Tet offensive happened. The allies undergo a failure of intelligence before Tet, a failure that helped plan the stages for changes in the strategies of the US. The four parts of intelligence are crucial in determining the actions of the enemy. The four tasks consist of collection of information, the analysis of the information, the decision to respond to a warning issued in the analytical stage, dissemination of the order to respond to the field co...
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, Joint Publication 2-01 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 January 2012).pg II-6
Sharpe, Col. (Ret.) James Jr. and LTC (Ret.) Thomas Creviston, “Understanding Mission Command.” www.Army.mil. (2013) http://www.army.mil/article/106872 (accessed 20 February, 2014).
The ability to understand a problem, determine the desired end state, and develop a strategy to achieve that end state is a highly sought after skill in every facet of the military profession. However, in a joint setting, the problems are generally much more complex requiring an advanced mastery of problem solving from joint staff officers. The complexities of planning on the joint staff level stem from the amount of education it takes to simply understand the problem. Joint staff officers not only must understand the components and capabilities of their own service, they must also understand any service they might interact with to include the nine combatant commands. These demands put a heavy emphasis on joint professional military education before the joint staff officer shows up to their assignm...
Compare and Contrast the Army Problem Solving Model (Process) with the Rapid Decision making and Synchronization Process. (C100)
...these intelligence failures, more emphasis is now placed on the creation of intelligence products used on the battlefield. All possible enemy courses of actions are now red teamed in an attempt to produce a much accurate analytical product.
I have organized this paper into five distinct sections; mission, task organization, capabilities, limitations, and finally the conclusion. After the reading and comprehension of this paper, you should have gained a basic understanding of the Special Forces (SF) Chemical Reconnaissance Detachments (CRD). The following paper is mixed with Unclassified (UCI) and For Official Use Only (FOUO) information. FOUO is annotated at the beginning of all For Official Use Only information, the rest of the paper is UCI. If you wish to share this information paper with others, please at a minimum; confirm identity of the person prior to providing (FM 380-5, 2000). For further handling instructions please refer to FM 380-5, or contact me, I will gladly answer all questions.