The Army has transformed several times during its history. Adapting to the operational environment is a necessity for the force called upon to prosecute its adversaries. The Army must do what is necessary to protect the U.S. against all enemies, and advance the national interests of the American people. To accomplish this, anticipation of threats is crucial and victory against its adversaries is an imperative. The nation relies on the military for strategic level deterrence and expects that it will be decisive in combat operations. For the military to be successful, it is important that transformation adapt to meet these expectations by conforming to the requirements of a successful force of the future in order meet any new threats in any environment around the world. Introduction The whole of military activity must therefore relate directly or indirectly to the engagement. The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained, the whole object of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching is simply that he should fight at the right place and the right time. (Clausewitz, 1976) Past military events have demonstrated the importance of anticipation and preparation for a wide spectrum of missions and capabilities. To conduct these operations, the U.S. Military must prepare to move and conduct them anywhere in the world. The Military must also have the capability to conduct low intensity wars against an ill-defined enemy as well as major conventional style conflicts against major states. Early in World War II, Germany decisively demonstrated the devastating effect of a new paradigm in military power. The allies had to play catch up and adapt quickly in order to survive. Germany’s early success quic... ... middle of paper ... ...strategic force that is both joint and expeditionary capable for any future contingency. As indicated by past military events, the anticipation and preparation for a wide spectrum of missions and capabilities will continue to ensure that the Army is the force for the 21st century. Works Cited Army Transformation Roadmap. (2004). Retrieved from: http://asc.army.mil/docs/transformation/2004_Army_Transformation_Roadmap.pdf Clausewitz, Carl von. (1976). On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Murray, Williamson. (2001). Army Transformation: A View From the U.S. Army War College. Retrieved from: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/armytran.pdf Stewart, R. W. (2005). American Military History Volume II. Washington D. C.: Center of Military History of the United States Army.
...in technology and tactics have made Special Forces units more reliable. For example, the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan and the incident with the Somali pirates of the coast of Somalia show the capabilities of today’s Special Forces. The author asserts that, in the future the United States will shift away from major combat operations. These large engagements have proven to be costly in lives and treasure. For that reason, she infers that the US Military will choose the “go small, go long” model for future engagements in the Middle East. Special operation forces are uniquely suited for this model. Their conspicuous nature and low cost make them politically and strategically ideal. The author also suggests that future large scale operations may look like the conflicts in Libya and Somalia rather than the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
War finds success and failure inescapably linked to how well the Combined, Joint, and Multinational Commander ensures the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment” planning is linked to strategic, operational and tactical objectives. General Eisenhower’s Operation OVERLORD, the Allied cross channel, air, and seaborne invasion of France during World War II provides an excellent case study to show successful integration of the principles and the spirit of the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment.” OVERLORD required synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating the logistics capabilities of coalition forces, their equipment as well as civilian manufacturing capabilities to meet the strategic end state (e.g. the defeat of Germany). This article will review the purpose and definition of Joint Sustainment, its imperatives and logistics planning principles and examine how Eisenhower and his planners incorporated these imperatives and principles into Operation OVERLORD.
This paper will not bore with the definition of a profession. The United States Army is about more than words, it is about action. The action of over 238 years of tradition and service. The Army is a profession. A profession requires its members to adhere to prolonged training and learn specialized skills. A member of a profession must wholly commit himself and his skills to a calling which is entrusted by the public. A profession provides its members with intrinsic value which motivates beyond financial gain. The Army is a higher calling which demands all of these qualities and more.
In today’s operational environments, the U.S. Army is facing a range of problems and mission sets that are arguably more complex than previously encountered. Forces face an array of demands that encompass geo-political, social, cultural, and military factors that interact in unpredictable ways. The inherent complexity of today’s operations has underscored the need for the Army to expand beyond its traditional approach to operational planning. In March 2010 in FM 5-0: The Operations
During World War II, Germany’s military was superior to anyone else in the world, with far more advanced technology, tactics, and weaponry. They had a fearless leader who would stop at nothing to make his country great again. Their closest rival, the Soviet Union, was almost out of the picture with a death toll of over 26 million. On top of that, Germany had nothing to lose, and would not conceivably stop. So how then, with all odds against them, did the Allies win the war? A combination of factors affected Germany’s downfall, such as lack of morale, unwieldy weapons, and failure to work with its so-called allies.
In all its years of fighting the US military has never looked so lean. The fat boy of the world’s militaries is being forced, by congress, on a diet plane not even Jenny Craig would suggest. Congress has told the US military simply, with looming budget cuts, to Charmin up because less simply has to do more. The US military is experiencing an unprecedented troop reduction due to lack of funding. Consequently, as newton stated so accurately so many years ago, “for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction”. As our military shrinks and generals are being told to do more with less, many are reacting by turning to advanced weapon technology to fill the void where boots once stood.
Operation Barbarossa was the beginning of the end of Germany’s Nazi party. Many historians believe that without Hitler’s underestimation of the Red Army, the Soviet’s response, and more importantly, Hitler’s mistakes leading into the Russian winter, Germany could very well have come out victorious in not only Operation Barbarossa, but World War II. The reasons of failure, clear but not concise, show that many different strategic decisions could have changed the outcome, as well as many other things in the world today.
As the operational environment changed, the operation showed that the United States was not looking at the problem objectively. General Petraeus came in, redefined the problem, and reframed the operational approach. Joint Publication 5.0 captures many of the lessons learned during this time. However, the United States needs to be mindful that it does not fight the last war, as it is prone to do.
In the post Afghanistan period, the Army will focus on regaining readiness to support the full range of combat operations and would be a key part of any large scale offensive or security requirement. A rebalance within the active and reserve components will achieve significant cost savings by placing a large percentage of the forces only necessary for extended ground campaigns in the reserves. The Army is essential to any large-scale force projection operation and functions as an integrated force with partners and allies
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
The U.S Army is the strongest most respected and feared ground force in the world. It is also the oldest branch of the military and also the largest U.S. Military Service. There are approximately 76,000 officers and 401,000 enlisted members in the active duty Army. The success of the Army lives and dies on themselves and others. The army protects all that the constitution stands for. And each soldier defends this to their last breath with Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Honor, and Personal Courage. The Army has a mission to protect and defend its nation. ( “Overcoming Challenges” np)
Zink, Harold. (1957) The United States in Germany, 1944-1955 [online]. Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand [cited 12th September 2011]. Available from:
As we transition from subjective training to objective, it is critical to understand the emphasis on training has not changed, just the language. Commander will continue to focus on battle focus training developed by long- range, short- range and near- term planning. The Sustainable Readiness Model (SRM) is the Army’s newest system for prioritizing resources for units on a 5-year cycle based on the level of readiness they must achieve. Each year of the cycle has established Personnel (P), Sustain (S) and Readiness (R) Aim Points on the Unit Status Report (USR). The SRM seeks to stabilize units in a “band of excellence,” even following their READY year, maintaining the highest readiness level instead of automatically downgrading their readiness to a C4 level regardless of whether they deployed. Guidelines in the Prepare Year (PY) found in the SRM will assist Commanders at every level on key training events they will need to focus on for that particular
Current military leadership should comprehend the nature of war in which they are engaged within a given political frame in order to develop plans that are coherent with the desired political end state. According to Clausewitz, war is an act of politics that forces an enemy to comply with certain conditions or to destroy him through the use of violence. A nation determines its vital interests, which drives national strategy to obtain or protect those interests. A country achieves those goals though the execution of one of the four elements of power, which are diplomatic, informational, military and economical means. The use of military force...
Because the leaders and commanders of WWI forever changed the nature of war, it influenced the later Nazi leaders decisions, and forced the next set of Allies to adapt to an entirely new concept of total war as i...