Are the challenges that military commanders face in the contemporary operating environment more complex than ever before?
The earliest date battle accounted was the Battle of Kadesh in 1274 BC involving approximately 5,000 to 6,000 chariots between Ramesses II of the Empire of Egypt and Muwatalli II of the Hittite Empire. The Battle of Kadesh took place at Kadesh City on the Orontes River, what is now adjacent to the modern-day village of Tell al-Nabi Mando of western Syria. This is the first ever in history of mankind that subtle elements of warfare and strategies are known.
Since the Battle of Kadesh, history has seen the numerous changes in major conflicts. The evolving of space and time, education, social and political strata have driven the changes of conflict and warfare. Throughout the years after the Battle of Kadesh, military strategies and warfare, operating environment and the causes of war have been evolved. From the Legions of the Roman Empire to the Airborne Infantry of World War II, the tangible threat of the Soviet Union and recently War in Afghanistan, Iraq War, War in Somalia and Gaza War have imposed the difficulties, amorphous, changing and ill-defined threats and challenges of the situation.
Current operating environment is no longer tangible. Many defence and military organizations have conducted studies to address the emerging threat that exist in the new contemporary environment. Brunei Strategic Plan 2004 has underlined to take holistic approach in order to mitigate the complexity and the uncertainty of current and future threats. The strategic plan outlines the importance of integration and interoperability among government stakeholders to address emerging threats. This demonstrate Brunei D...
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...ing First In The Contemporary Operational Environment. A Monograph. 2012. p 5
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The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief analysis of the United States Army’s organizational structure and its culture and how these two elements impact its workers, associates and affiliates. This paper will first examine the Army’s history, development and structure to highlight the origins of the Army’s culture. Secondly, a brief history of the Army’s organizational development will be followed by a close examination of its philosophy and supporting beliefs. Lastly, this paper will discuss the role of the Army’s leadership, their response to critical issues and the organizational structure of the Army. An analysis of the army’s top leaders will help the reader to understand the Army culture more thoroughly in the context of the Army’s organizational structure. More specifically this section of the paper will examine the Army leadership’s response to the current geo-political environment and other related issues. In conclusion, this paper hopes to highlight the Army’s overall functioning from an organizational standpoint and emphasize that idea that the Army is like a functional corporation. This will be accomplished by addressing various key questions throughout this text.
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In this paper, I will provide a Battle Analysis and outline the events leading up to and surrounding the Battle of 73 Eastings (refers to a north-south grid line). In addition, I will describe how the United States Army’s (USA) 2nd Armored Calvary Regiment (ACR) defeated forces from the Iraqi Republican Guard (IRG) using speed, technology and superior combat power. Although some consider the Battle of 73 Eastings extremely successful, some consider it a failure due to the large amount of Iraqi forces that retreated towards Bagdad. Lastly, I will analyze how each side used their intelligence assets and what they could have used to change the outcome.
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The Battle of Kamdesh was fought in Afghanistan during the Afghan War. It is an occurrence in the ongoing NATO campaign of the Operation Enduring Freedom since the year 2001. It was one of the bloodiest battles the USA forces engaged in during this campaign against the Taliban insurgents. The Taliban insurgents, assisted by local Nuristan militias, attacked Kamdesh, which is an American combat outpost, located deep in the Nuristan tribal Areas. They carried out a well-coordinated attack on the outpost, leading to a breach and an overrun of the post. This paper, seeks to analyze why, when, how, and what were the resulting impact of the battle.
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